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HEALTH CARE SPENDING AND FINANCIAL
SECURITY AFTER THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT*
ALLISON K. HOFFMAN"
Health insurance has fallen notoriously short of protecting
Americans from financial insecurity caused by health care
spending. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("A CA") attempted to ameliorate this shortcoming by regulating
health insurance. The ACA offers a new policy vision of how
health insurance will (and perhaps should) serve to promote
financial security in the face of health care spending. Yet, the
ACA's policy vision applies differently among insured, based on
the type of insurance they have, resulting in inconsistent types
and levels offinancialprotection among Americans.
To examine this picture of inconsistent financial protection, this
Article offers a taxonomy to describe ways in which health
insurance regulation can promote financialsecurity. It then uses
this taxonomy to map the effect the ACA will have on the
financial security of various insured populations. Specifically, it
analyzes how much a person in poor health might spend out of
pocket on health care in three scenarios: a person with average
coverage through an individual-market health insurance
exchange, a worker with employer-sponsored insurance, and a
retiree with Medicare and a supplemental insurance plan. This
analysis reveals two effects. First, the ACA alleviates financial
risk from health care spending to some degree in all three
scenarios. But, second, the ACA preserves (and may even
exacerbate) variability in the degree and type of financial risk
remaining across the three scenarios. In effect, the ACA asserts
and affirms different visions of the role of health insurance in
promoting financial security for different people. This
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inconsistency leaves some insured especially vulnerable to
spending and creates complexity that may impede insured from
comprehending these points of vulnerability.
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INTRODUCTION

A central goal of health insurance is to protect people from
financial insecurity caused by spending on medical care.' Yet,
historically, health insurance in the United States has failed to ensure
1. See Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual
Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1873,
1908-12 (2011) (describing one goal of health insurance as promoting financial security).
Insurance can serve other purposes as well. Insurance provides access to hospitals and
doctors in hopes of promoting health. See id. It also can help shape behaviors through
incentives and pricing structures. See id.
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sufficient financial protection for many Americans. 2 People have
struggled to pay high premiums, their share of costs when their
insurance pays only for part of their care, or the cost of care not
covered by insurance at all. Health care spending is a major factor in
bankruptcy filings, both for insured and uninsured Americans. 3
Elizabeth Warren remarked that "[e]very 30 seconds in the United
States, someone files for bankruptcy in the aftermath of a serious
health problem."' Even when health care spending does not push a
household all the way to bankruptcy, it can nonetheless cause
financial and emotional stress.'
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the "ACA")6
attempted to ensure that Americans would have adequate health
insurance, in part to reduce these threats to financial security. Before
the ACA was enacted into law, President Barack Obama testified to
Congress: "That's what Americans who have health insurance can
expect from this plan-more security and stability."'
Yet, even after full implementation, Americans will enjoy
different types and levels of financial protection, depending on their
source and type of insurance. This is because the ACA is built on a
complex structure of insurance design and regulation. The ACA
2. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 139 (2006) (noting that
"today, medical costs and insurance are at the heart of insecurity in the United States");
David U. Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH
AFF. W5-63, W5-72 (2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/02/02
/hlthaff.w5.63.full.pdf+html (noting that "middle-class Americans ... face impoverishment
following a serious illness"); David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the
United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 743 (2009) (finding
that medical bills contribute to many bankruptcies); Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman,
Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICS 239, 240, 286 (2010) (claiming that the court-record method, which involves
looking at the court documents submitted by bankruptcy filers, "is an unreliable measure
of the financial burden of illness or injury faced by bankruptcy filers" and underrepresents
the actual hardship). See generally Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing
the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States,
98 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 243 (2004) (arguing that the convergence of stagnant policies,
including health policy, and changing social realities have left Americans more financially
vulnerable).
3. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
4. Elizabeth Warren, Sick and Broke, WASH. POST, Feb. 9,2005, at A23.
5. See, e.g., HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 2 at 138-40.
6. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(2012)).
7. President Barack Obama, Health Care Address to Congress (Sep. 9, 2009)
(transcript available in the N.Y Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/us/politics
/lobama.text.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).
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preserves, and even intensifies the effect of, a health insurance system
fragmented between many types and sources of insurance, each
governed by different regulators and regulations.'
This Article illuminates the resulting inconsistent picture of
financial risk for Americans by examining how much a member of
different insured groups might spend out of pocket on health
insurance and medical care after the ACA is fully implemented. The
difficult normative question, which this Article only begins to answer,
is whether the ACA's approach, even if inconsistent, might make
sense, either politically or normatively. This Article reveals the places
where this inconsistency leaves some insured especially vulnerable,
even after full ACA implementation, and questions whether these
remaining gaps are defensible. This Article additionally illustrates
how the ACA adds to the complexity of health care spending risk,
which could make it difficult for Americans to comprehend.
As a precursor to critical examination, Part I of this Article offers
an original taxonomy of four different aspects of financial risk that
health policy could attempt to reduce. First, health care regulation
could reduce baseline spending so that most people who are in
relatively good health spend little on premiums and on medical care
in a given year. Second, it could reduce potential variability in
spending, making what an insured is likely to spend more predictable,
whether in a year of good or bad health. Third, it could reduce
catastrophic risk, so that, even if unpredictable, spending would never
rise to an unmanageable level for any individual, no matter how much
medical care she may need. Finally, even if none or all of the above
were true, regulation could increase transparency so that Americans
could understand how much they might spend on health care and how
the amount might vary based on their health. Depending on which of
these aspects are emphasized, health insurance regulation pursues the
goal of improved financial security in different ways.
Part II then traces which aspects health policy-including the
ACA-emphasizes for different groups of insured, by examining
three stylized scenarios of health insurance and spending. These three
scenarios, considered together, represent the most common ways
Americans will obtain health insurance. They are: (1) a person who
buys an average, or "silver-level," plan on an individual health
insurance exchange; (2) a worker who has a health insurance plan
8. For a detailed discussion of this "fragmented" structure, see generally Allison K.
Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health
Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2010).
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from her employer; and (3) a retiree with Medicare and Medigap
private insurance. Examining these three common cases necessarily
leaves out a number of others, including Medicaid beneficiaries,
people buying individual market coverage outside of exchanges, and
those with military coverage. Furthermore, because these examples
are stylized, and not modeled based on individual characteristics, they
are meant to be rough illustrations, not precise estimates. The goal of
this Article is not to estimate spending for every insured but rather to
illustrate the variability of financial protections-and different visions
of how regulation can promote financial security-for members of the
most common groups of insured.
This Article's analysis paints three different pictures of financial
security for different insured groups after full implementation of the
ACA, explored in Part III below. Each picture emphasizes
ameliorating different aspects of financial risk.
For the person who buys individual coverage from a new health
insurance exchange, the ACA defines security as insurance
protection against catastrophic spending on essential medical
care, but requires moderate to high baseline spending on
premiums and cost sharing, even in a healthy year. This model
best captures traditional economic notions of insurance.
For the worker with insurance through her employer, the ACA
perpetuates a regulatory approach that largely allows
employers to determine what role insurance coverage will play
in protecting her from financial threats. With this deferential
approach, the ACA preserves a system where employees
currently enjoy low baseline spending in a typical year and little
variable spending, even in a year of bad health. It also preserves
the possibility that a worker could face catastrophic risk from
spending on any items and services an employer decides not to
cover, which could in theory include essential medical care.
For retirees, Medicare policy defines security in two different
ways, which are preserved and reinforced by the ACA. A
minority of retirees with only Original Medicare and no
supplemental coverage enjoy low baseline spending but face
high potential for variable spending and catastrophic risk. This
structure results in low financial risk for the typical, reasonably
healthy retiree but leaves those with more serious medical
needs vulnerable. Yet, most retirees buy supplemental
insurance coverage for additional protection, choosing instead a
definition of financial security that includes high premiums but
limited variable spending on covered benefits. This second
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picture is structurally similar to that for exchange enrollees in
some ways (high baseline spending and low catastrophic risk).
But, after the ACA, retirees face relatively greater financial
risk from three sources: higher premiums, the potential for
spending on uncovered care, and the complexity of insurance
terms. Retirees are arguably the most vulnerable to financial
risk from health care spending in a post-ACA world.
There are reasons why the ACA's inconsistent approach may be
socially beneficial, especially to the degree this inconsistency helped
to pass legislation that improves financial security overall. But some
aspects of the ACA's approach, or its omissions, leave insured people
highly exposed to certain aspects of financial risk, as examined in Part
III. For example, after the ACA is implemented, retirees arguably
will be less protected from both baseline and catastrophic spending
than younger workers who buy exchange coverage. In effect, the
ACA has raised the bar for many younger Americans but left older
ones behind. Furthermore, health insurance regulations, both those
predating and in the ACA, create a level of complexity that is welfare
reducing to the extent it prevents Americans from understanding and
managing health care spending risk. Once the implementation dust
settles, it is critical to reexamine the places where the greatest
financial risk from health care spending remains and to continue to
work to ameliorate it as necessary. This Article provides a foundation
for such examination.
I. THE GOAL OF FINANCIAL SECURITY AND ROLE OF HEALTH
INSURANCE REGULATION

Insurance can reduce threats to financial security by distributing
health care spending. First, it distributes health care spending intertemporally, evening out any one person's total lifetime spending yearto-year. In this way, insurance is a savings or borrowing device. A
person pays premiums every year and draws from these funds when
she needs medical care. Second, it can distribute health care
expenditures among a population, interpersonally. Health care use
and expenditures are notoriously skewed among the U.S. population.
The top 30% of spenders account on average for over $12,000 each in
health care expenditures, the top 10% for nearly $27,000 each, and
the top 1% for an astounding $90,000 each.' Health insurance
9. NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., THE CONCENTRATION OF HEALTH
CARE SPENDING: NIHCM FOUNDATION DATA BRIEF 3 fig.2 (Jul. 2012), available at
http://www.nihcm.org/pdflDataBrief3%20Final.pdf;

see also Marc L. Berk & Alan C.
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distributes these expenditures among a "risk pool," so that everyone
contributes to the pool's funds by paying premiums and the unhealthy
draw from these funds to pay for needed medical care. These two
types of distribution can smooth spending so that, in an ideal world,
no one individual would bear unaffordable health care expenses in
any one year.
Despite its ability to smooth spending, which should make it
easier for individuals to afford needed medical care, health insurance
has not always protected Americans well from health care spending
risk. Several different threats can cause even someone with health
insurance to struggle to finance her health care needs.
People with health insurance may struggle to pay high premiums.
High premiums might result when an insured is part of a "bad"
insurance risk pool, where many people use a large amount of
expensive care. The result is that even with interpersonal distribution
of spending in the risk pool, the average cost per person and, in turn,
the average premium, is high. This problem is exacerbated by the
overall growth in health care spending over the past few decades. 0
High premiums might also result when costs are not distributed
evenly among members of a risk pool. In the United States, unlike in
most countries, insurers have historically been able to "experience"
or risk-rate policies, charging higher premiums to applicants they
think might spend more on health care, based on their individual
health profile or other attributes such as sex or age.n The result is
that some people are charged relatively higher premiums and others
relatively low ones. With high premiums, the cost of health insurance
alone could add to the feeling of financial insecurity for an insured,
even before she uses any medical care.
In addition, an insured might struggle to pay her share of costs
when she uses medical care. She might face high spending if her
policy, sometimes referred to as "bare-bones" insurance, requires her
to pay a high proportion of the cost of covered benefits she uses. For
example, a policy might require that she pay 20% of any
Monheit, The Concentrationof Health Care Expenditures, Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Mar.Apr. 2001, at 9 (indicating "a relatively small proportion of the population accounting for
a large share of expenditures"). Among Medicare beneficiaries, the picture is similar. The
top 5% spent an average of over $62,000 each in 2004. Gerald F. Riley, Long-Term Trends
in The Concentrationof Medicare Spending, 26 HEALTH AFF. 808,811 fig.2 (2007).
10. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: KEY INFORMATION
ON HEALTH CARE COSTS AND THEIR IMPACT 1 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamily
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7670-03.pdf.
11. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & PETER D. JACOBSON, LAW AND THE HEALTH
SYSTEM 340 (2006).
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hospitalization or doctor visit. Or the policy might include a
deductible, where she pays for the first $5,000 in medical care before
the plan begins to pay for care. Another source of high out-of-pocket
costs is when insurance benefits are not comprehensive. For example,
an insurance policy could exclude benefits for certain medical
conditions, such as certain fertility care or HIV care, in which case the
insured would have to pay for the entire cost of any care she uses for
these conditions.
Out-of-pocket spending can be catastrophic for someone who is
particularly unlucky or unhealthy and needs substantial medical care,
even if the individual has coverage that would be adequate in most
situations.12 It is not uncommon for someone to have substantial
needs over multiple years," which would pose financial strain to
nearly all families if this spending were not adequately mitigated by
insurance.
Finally, financial insecurity can be exacerbated by the opacity of
the terms of health insurance coverage. Even if the out-of-pocket
health care spending required under a policy-for premiums and cost
sharing-is predictable, if consumers do not understand the terms of
the policy well enough to predict their own required spending, they
will fail to budget for it. Decisions regarding health insurance and
health care, which affect spending, tend to be some of the most
complex financial decisions people have to make. Studies have shown
that people fail to understand the potential for catastrophic risk. 4 In
other words, they fail to understand how much more they might
spend if they have a year of bad health than they would in the typical
year.'" Thus, even those people who could in theory protect

12. Extremely high spending is concentrated among older and less healthy individuals.
NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., supra note 9, at 4 fig.3 (demonstrating that

people over sixty-four make up 40% of the top 1% of spenders on health care, but just
13% of the total U.S. population).
13. See id. at 6 ("Forty-five percent of those in the top decile of spending in 2008 and
one in five of those in the very highest spending group remained in that group in the next
year.").
14. See, e.g., Allison K. Hoffman & Howell E. Jackson, Retiree Out-of-Pocket
Healthcare Spending: A Study of Consumer Expectations and Policy Implications, 39 AM.
J.L. & MED. 62, 68 (2013) ("Furthermore, they underestimated the potential effect of
individual health experience, which can result in an individual having double to triple
expenditures of the typical retiree; only a fifth of all respondents estimated that adverse
health experience could lead to a more than 50% increase in out-of-pocket costs. To
oversimplify, some people know costs; few know risk.").
15. See id.; NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., supra note 9, at 11.
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themselves against high out-of-pocket expenditures are generally not
aware of what it would take to do so. 16
There is wide consensus that one important goal of health
insurance regulation is to reduce these threats and to promote
financial security in light of health care spending. However, there is
no consensus on how to best maximize financial security. The
following original taxonomy delineates four different ways health
care policy might try to maximize financial security in the face of
health care spending. By emphasizing one (or more) of these aspects,
policies implicitly give meaning to the goal of financial security and
determine how health insurance will help promote this goal.17
1. Financial security might be maximized when a person spends
as little as possible on health care in a typical, relatively healthy
year, determined mostly by health insurance premiums, in light
of low use of medical care.s
This is a definition of financial security as low baseline spending.
2. Financial security might be maximized when an individual's
spending, especially on benefits covered by a plan, is not widely
variable. Although someone might predictably spend a
predetermined amount on health care in a typical year, she can
assume that her out-of-pocket spending will vary little from this
amount, even in a year of bad health. In recent years, the
potential for variable spending, especially on covered benefits,
has increased with the growth of high-deductible health plans
or other plan designs that require high cost sharing.19 These
plans may cause some people to underuse necessary care to
avoid spending money on it, 20 or, if they do use care, to struggle
16. See generally Hoffman & Jackson, supra note 14 (finding that a disproportionate
number of Americans estimate their future out-of-pocket health care costs to be
substantially below what experts predict).
17. Cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES
6-7 (2010) (describing how statutes can "fill in the huge holes in our governance structure
and norms" or entrench norms over time).
18. See, e.g., KAREN DAVIS, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, WHY HEALTH REFORM
MUST COUNTER THE RISING COSTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS (2009),
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/BlogDavis
.BlogAugust_ 09 rev.pdf ("Health insurance is already becoming unaffordable for
families and businesses, with premium inflation outpacing wage increases.").
19. See generally TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE
OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT (2007) (describing and criticizing the rise of
Consumer-Driven Health Care and high deductible health plans).
20. See, e.g., JONATHAN GRUBER, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF
CONSUMER COPAYMENTS FOR HEALTH CARE: LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT AND BEYOND 9 (2006), available at http://kaiserfamily
(discussing various studies on the
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/017566.pdf
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to finance it.21 In addition, low variability is important for some
people so they can plan spending in a way that maximizes their
welfare, allocating neither too much nor too little of income to
health care or health savings accounts.
This is a definition of financial security through low variability in
spending.
3. Financial security might be maximized when variable
spending is no more than any one particular person could
handle, based on individual assets, income, and other
expenses.2 2 Professors Michael Graetz and Jerry Mashaw define
financial security as protection against the risk of falling below
a "decent" income level or the risk of an "unacceptably steep
decline in living standards" caused by medical spending.'
Regulation taking this approach might allow variability in
spending, even high variability for high-income Americans, so
long as the variability is tied to what is reasonable based on an
individual's resources. This vision requires defining what
"decent" means and what constitutes an "unacceptable steep
decline," as well as the right timeframe for measuring spending
burden (e.g., over the course of one year or over a lifetime).24
This is a definition of financial security as no catastrophicrisk.
4. Regardless of the level of risk along the aforementioned
dimensions, financial security could be maximized through
elasticity of demand for various medical treatments); JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INS.
EXPERIMENT GRP., FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE
EXPERIMENT 339-40 (1993) (summarizing results of the RAND health experiment,
including an adverse effect on the health of the sick poor with increased cost sharing); M.
Gregg Bloch, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Disadvantaged,26 HEALTH AFF.
1315, 1318 (2007) (explaining that the consumer-directed health care model does not
necessarily "inspire[] patients to economize wisely"); Sara R. Collins, Consumer-Driven
Health Care: Why it Won't Solve What Ails the United States Health System, 28 J. LEGAL
MED. 53, 55 (2007) (reviewing literature on effect of high-deductible plans on health);
Thomas Rice & Karen Y. Matsuoka, The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Appropriate
Utilizationand Health Status: A Review of the Literature on Seniors, 61 MED. CARE RES.
& REV. 415, 420-26 (2004) (detailing the effect of cost-sharing on the health and mortality
of seniors).
21. See, e.g., Alison A. Galbraith et al., Nearly Half Of Families In High-Deductible
Health Plans Whose Members Have Chronic Conditions Face Substantial Financial
Burden, 30 HEALTH AFF. 322, 322 (2011) (describing the results of an empirical study of
the financial burden of plans with deductibles of at least $1,000 per individual or $2,000
per family for people with chronic conditions).
22. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY 146 (1999)
("[I]t is the job of social insurance to protect family income streams . . .
23. Id. at 171.
24. See Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1915-16 (discussing different ways to measure these
metrics).
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transparency. In other words, no matter how much an
individual might spend, the range of possible spending would be
obvious to that individual.
This is a definition of financial security through transparency.
This Article focuses on financial regulation with regard to the first
three aspects of financial risk, in particular, but notes where lack of
transparency exacerbates risk in the scenarios below.
Both prior to and as part of the ACA, three key types of
regulatory tools are used to attempt to ameliorate financial risk:
pricing regulation, cost-sharing limits (regulating deductibles,
copayments, or coinsurance when someone uses medical care covered
by a policy), and coverage regulation (mandated coverage of certain
benefits). Pricing regulations limit what any one individual might
spend on premiums by spreading the costs of health care more evenly
over someone's lifetime or among all insured. Such regulation
includes, for example, community rating, which requires that insurers
charge the same premium to everyone who chooses a particular
health insurance plan. The second and third types of regulation
attempt to limit variable out-of-pocket spending on medical care and
to reduce catastrophic risk.26 Cost-sharing limits explicitly cap what
any one individual might have to pay out of pocket for covered
services, curbing variable spending and catastrophic risk due to "bare
bones" coverage. Coverage regulations, or "mandated benefits,"
ensure common or critical treatments are covered by a policy. These
rules limit what an individual might have to fund completely out of
pocket. Examples include state laws mandating coverage of benefits
for designated medical conditions or populations 27 and the essential
25. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of
Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 396 (2014) ("A
central goal of financial regulation is to promote markets that are more transparent for
consumers and retail investors."); Karen Pollitz & Larry Levitt, Health Insurance
Transparency under the Affordable CareAct, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 8,
2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/perspective/health-insurance-transparency-under-theaffordable-care-act/ (describing ACA provisions that protect consumers by requiring
reporting of policy terms and payment practices).
26. Other regulations, which are not detailed herein, can attempt to ensure a
sufficient network of providers to offer these services. If provider shortages become a
problem with increased insurance coverage, these regulations could become increasingly
important over time.
27. See, e.g., State Health Insurance Mandates and the ACA Essential Benefits
Provisions, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/stateins-mandates-and-aca-essential-benefits.aspx (last updated Jan. 2, 2014) (describing the
use of mandated benefit laws by the states before and after the ACA's creation of
"Essential Health Benefits").

1492

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

health benefits required under the ACA, discussed below. In addition
to these regulations, subsidized or free health insurance is often
provided to low-income households for additional protection, as in
the case with the Medicaid program and the new premium and costsharing subsidies under the ACA, discussed below.28
This Article suggests that through its regulatory provisions, as
well as its omissions, the ACA offers a new de facto definition of how
health insurance will (and perhaps should) be structured to better
promote financial security. This definition is, however, inconsistent
among different insured groups because health policy emphasizes
different aspects of financial security for different types of insurance.
II. REGULATION AND FINANCIAL SECURITY AFTER THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

This Part examines the post-ACA picture of financial security for
different groups of insured, by considering the level and types of
financial risk from health care spending that an individual with
moderate income and in poor health could face in each of three
stylized scenarios. These three scenarios together represent how the
majority of Americans will get insurance: (1) a person buying health
insurance on the individual market exchanges; (2) a worker who has
coverage through an employer; and (3) a retiree with Medicare.
Estimates are based on what an individual who earns the median
household income 29 and who has median household assets might
28. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
29. Part II uses median gross household income by age group (over sixty-five or under
sixty-five) for a rough estimation. Reliance on this approximation is admittedly imprecise
in several ways. First, income differs based on the characteristics of the member(s) of the
household, including number of people, race, geography, and gender, as well as type of
insurance. The stylized scenarios below do not attempt to model income based on these
particular characteristics, nor do they intend to make precise estimates of insurance costs
based on such characteristics. Rather, they offer a rough estimate of possible spending for
an illustrative member of each group of insured with moderate income and in poor health
to show what spending exposure might be for someone who does not qualify for subsidies
on the exchanges or in the Medicare program. Thus, the scenarios do not attempt to
capture the ways in which health care spending is disparately burdensome
demographically. Second, the analysis below relies primarily on gross income, rather than
a measure of after-tax income for two reasons. One is that gross income is often used for
rough budgetary benchmark discussions with respect to a particular good. Another is that
gross income is the best data available separately for both those under age sixty-five and
those over age sixty-five. However, with regard to non-retirees, I note spending as a
percentage of median U.S. adjusted gross income as well to give a sense of how much of a
household's take-home pay might be consumed by health care spending. The first two
scenarios (exchange coverage and ESI) are based on gross income for households under
age sixty-five, which was $57,353 in 2012. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS
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spend out of pocket on health care, premiums, cost sharing, and
uncovered care. These out-of-pocket spending estimates are based on
the formal limits set in the ACA and on early empirical projections of
spending for different populations. They illuminate the post-ACA de
facto definitions of how health insurance will protect the financial
security of different populations.
A.

Overview of the Regulation of Health InsuranceBefore and After
the ACA

Unlike in most developed countries, there is no one primary
system for health care financing in the United States, and the many
types of health care financing are often regulated differently.30 The
ACA is built on this complex structure of insurance design and
regulation, and it perpetuates and exacerbates this complex structure.
The result is that the financial protections insured enjoy differ
depending on the type of insurance they have and, often, on where
they live.
Health insurance is divided between public and private coverage.
Public coverage is available to about one-third of Americans who
qualify through one of several programs," including Medicare for
people over age sixty-five and people who are disabled, Medicaid for
qualifying low-income individuals, and military coverage for active
service people, veterans, and their families.32 Private health insurance,
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 6 tbl.1 (2013), available at

https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf. Although I assume the same income
for both scenarios, exchange enrollees, as a group, will likely have lower income than
those with coverage through an employer for two reasons. The first is that, by definition,
they do not have jobs with health benefits, and those jobs tend to be lower-income jobs.
The second is that because of the subsidies discussed herein, lower-income people have
more incentive to enroll in exchange coverage. For the Medicare scenario, I consider
median income among people over age sixty-five, which was $33,848 in 2012. Id. This
estimate, like any single measure applied to a large and diverse population, is both too
high and too low. For example, the median single woman over age sixty-five earns much
less than the median single man or household with a married couple over age sixty-five, in
part due to declining income with age and the fact that women live longer. Median
adjusted gross income for the entire population was just under $35,000 in 2011, the last
year of data available. STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
2013 TAX STATISTICS 2 (2013) (reporting adjusted gross income of $34,794, based on tax
year 2011 returns).
30. See GOSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 11, at 334-39.
31. See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 29, at 26 tbl.8 (reporting 33% of
Americans have government insurance, of whom 16% have Medicare, 16% have
Medicaid, and over 4% have military health care (note that these groups are not mutually
exclusive)).
32. See id.
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which is the sole available coverage for most people below age sixtyfive, is offered in three main "markets"-large group employersponsored insurance ("ESI") for employee groups with over fifty
people, small group ESI for groups with fewer than fifty people, and
"individual market" coverage, where someone buys a policy directly
from an insurance company." In 2011, before full ACA
implementation, an estimated 64% of the U.S. population had private
health insurance, most through an employer.3 4 Nearly 16% of the
population was uninsured.35
Different regulatory bodies and substantive requirements govern
each type of insurance. Private health insurance regulation is reserved
to the states, unless the federal government explicitly expresses its
intention to regulate. 6 The federal government can in theory create
rules that apply consistently across all types of insurance. Several
federal laws, for example, mandate coverage of specific benefits in
health plans to protect individuals from health discrimination. These
laws require plans to cover certain maternity-related benefits" and to
have parity in coverage of mental health and substance abuse
disorder benefits, on the one hand, and medical and surgical benefits,
on the other."
But before the ACA, the federal government rarely regulated
health insurance and, even when it did, often chose to apply different
substantive rules to different types of insurance. For example, one
important federal law, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"),3 9 prohibited employers from
discriminating against employees based on health status,4 limited the
33. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., How PRIVATE INSURANCE WORKS: 2008
UPDATE 1, 18 (2008), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com
/2013/01/7766.pdf (discussing the divide between employer-sponsored insurance and
individual coverage and how regulations "vary by market segment (e.g., large group, small
group, or individual coverage)").
34. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supranote 29, at 26 tbl.2.
35. Id.
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2012) (giving states the authority to regulate the "business of
insurance" unless federal law specifically intends to regulate insurance).
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185.
38. See § 1185a.
39. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
40. § 1182 ("[p]rohibiting discrimination against individual participants and
beneficiaries based on health status"). While the terms might be facially neutral, however,
employers could still exclude whole categories of treatment in a way that might have a
disparate impact on employees. See, e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403,
408 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an employer who reduced the medical benefits for
employees with AIDS did not discriminate illegally).
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exclusion of preexisting conditions in employer plans,4 1 and required
insurers to sell insurance to any employer who applied for group
coverage.42 Although making insurance more accessible and
affordable for people in employer plans through these regulations,
HIPAA did little for people who obtained insurance coverage on the
individual market, perpetuating the regulatory variability between
types of private coverage.
An obvious consequence of reserving private insurance
regulation to states is that health insurance regulation also varies
substantively by geography. For example, before the ACA, states
had, on average, eighteen mandated benefits that insurers had to
include in all policies they issued,43 and the number of mandates
varied from two in Idaho to thirty-five in California." This story is the
same for other types of health insurance regulation. Eighteen states
have some kind of regulation that limits how much insurers can
charge an individual who is buying a policy directly from an insurer45
and twelve states subsidize such coverage for certain low-income
individuals.46
The variability among types of insurance is further exacerbated
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"),4 7 which prevents some state regulation from applying to
some ESI plans. The law's aim was to ensure that employers
operating across multiple states could create consistent plans without
having to comply with fifty different states' laws.48 ERISA
preemption allows states to regulate any "fully-insured" plan, where
an individual or employer buys a plan directly from an insurance
company licensed in the state.49 Yet, under ERISA, states cannot
regulate so-called "self-funded" or "self-insured" plans, in which an
41. § 1181.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012) (modified by the ACA to apply to individual coverage
as well).
43. See Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An
Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1364.
44. See id.
45. Individual Market Rate Restrictions, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/individual-market-rate-restrictions/ (last visited Nov. 23,

2013).

46. Health Insurance Subsidies in the Individual Market, as of January2012, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/health-insurance-subsidiesindividual-market/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
47. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012)).
48. See id.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012); see also GOSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 11, at 33435 (explaining ERISA preemption); HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 33, at
16.
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employer retains liability for claims, rather than transferring risk to
an insurer.so Not surprisingly, many employers, including a majority
of large employers, have chosen to self-insure and thus avoid state
insurance regulation of their employee-health plans altogether." The
result of all of this fragmentation-structural and regulatory-is a
complex web of health insurance that varies by market and by
geography.
The ACA perpetuated and exacerbated this complexity. The
ACA attempted to regulate the individual market, in particular, to
ensure better access and affordability.5 2 Secondary goals were to
disrupt existing coverage as little as possible and to create a politically
palatable reform plan." To achieve these goals, the ACA preserved
existing insurance market structures and perpetuated regulatory
fragmentation to a large degree.54 For example, while lawmakers
could have created a more consistent set of regulations for all types of
private insurance, they applied different rules to different insurance
markets and chose to exempt self-insured plans from some of the
ACA's substantive insurance regulations. The result is that employers
who self-insure still retain great leeway over the design of their health
plans." The ACA added another level of fragmentation by
"grandfathering" a number of health insurance plans that were in
place before the ACA became law in 2010, exempting them from
many of the ACA's requirements, at least in the short term.56 The
50. § 1144(a). Because most employers who self-insure obtain stop-loss policies, in
reality, they retain limited risk.
51. see HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. AND HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC.
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2013 ANNUAL SURVEY 158 (2013), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/8465-employer-health-benefits20132.pdf [hereinafter KFF & HRET ANNUAL SURVEY] (reporting 61% of covered
workers were in a self-funded plan).
52. See infra Part II.B.1.
53. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Town Hall on Health Care,
Grand Junction, Colo. (Aug. 15, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/the-pressoffice/Remarks-By-The-President-In-Town-Hall-On-Health-Care-GrandJunction-Coloradol).
54. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the Affordable Care Act and Border
Crossing Techniques and How to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 27,
27-30 (2011) (explaining inconsistent application of ACA regulations).
55. See id.
56. For example, the federally mandated "essential health benefits" and limits on outof-pocket expenditures do not apply to grandfathered plans. ACA § 1251, 42 U.S.C.
§ 18011 (2012). A plan must remain substantially the same over time to enjoy this status,
which will cause plans to slowly relinquish this status over time as economically necessary.
Plans lose grandfathered status by making major changes, such as eliminating all or
substantially all benefits to treat a particular condition, increasing coinsurance
percentages, or decreasing employer contribution by more than five percentage points
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result of the ACA's approach, layered over preexisting regulation, is
the variable picture of financial protections for different insured
populations examined below.
B.

Regulation and Risk in Three Illustrative Scenarios

For each of the three scenarios considered, this Section describes
the type of coverage, outlines the relevant ACA regulations, and
estimates maximum possible out-of-pocket spending for an individual
with each type of insurance coverage. The discussion considers three
types of out-of-pocket spending that can pose threats to financial
security: (1) premiums; (2) cost sharing on covered benefits, and (3)
spending on care not covered under a policy. If either the second or
third type of variable spending is high or unlimited, an insured faces
catastrophic spending risk. The tables below summarize possible outof-pocket spending of each kind and, where possible, include ballpark
estimates of total spending as a percentage of income.s" Where there
is significant unknown variable spending on cost sharing or uncovered
benefits, the percentage estimates do not include this spending, but
the tables note that it exists.
1. Individual with Silver-Level Individual Coverage from an
Exchange
One of the main goals of the ACA was to ensure that people
who do not have insurance through their jobs could afford meaningful
coverage. Before the ACA, this population was unquestionably the
most vulnerable to financial insecurity due to health care spending.
They struggled to get coverage at all and, because there were few
limitations on how much insurers could charge them for coverage, the
coverage they could get was often unaffordable.8 After full ACA
from the rate in place on March 23, 2010. Preservation of Right to Maintain Existing
Coverage, 45 C.F.R. § 147.140 (2013). For a clear and concise summary of grandfathering,
see Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Grandfathered Plans, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (June 15, 2010), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/06/15/implementing-healthreform-grandfathered-plans.
57. The percentage of income estimates are based on median average income for an
under age sixty-five household and an over age sixty-five household, and not tailored
based on family size, gender, type of employment, and other characteristics. They are not
meant as precise estimates, as might be possible through modeling, but rather are an
attempt to give a ballpark sense of what a person with each type of coverage might spend
on health care. See supra note 29.
58. See SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SQUEEZED: WHY
RISING EXPOSURE TO HEALTH CARE COSTS THREATENS THE HEALTH AND FINANCIAL

WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 4 (2006), available at http://www.common
wealthfund.org/usr-doc/collins-squeezedrisinghltcarecosts 953.pdf.
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implementation, an estimated twenty-six million people will buy a
health insurance policy from a health insurance exchange, a new
online marketplace established by the ACA.59 The ACA regulates
these policies extensively. As a result, the population buying an
exchange plan is not only less financially vulnerable than they were
before reform but also arguably less vulnerable in some ways than
people with insurance through an employer or Medicare.
As illustrated below, the ACA preserves the potential for
relatively high baseline costs but largely curbs catastrophic spending
for someone who buys a silver-level exchange plan. Even in the worst
case, the insured in this scenario would spend twenty to 30% of
income out of pocket on health care.' While this amount is
substantial, it may not mean financial disaster, especially if not
recurrent over multiple years.
a.

Regulation of Exchange Coverage Under the ACA

The ACA limits financial risk for someone who buys a plan on
an individual market exchange in two ways. First, it attempts to
ensure Americans will be able to get insurance with affordable
premiums. Toward this goal, the ACA requires that insurers issue
coverage to anyone who applies, thereby giving access to people who
previously faced unlimited risk because they could not get insurance
at all.' Once insured, the ACA attempts to limit the variation in
premiums for similar coverage among these insured. It prohibits
insurers from excluding any pre-existing conditions from coverage6 2
and from "risk-rating" or charging someone more based on her
individual characteristics or health history.63 Premiums may still vary,
but based on only four factors: family size, geography, tobacco use
status, and age.' For example, premiums might vary by a factor of 3:1
based on age,65 which means that a sixty year-old may be charged
premiums no more than three times as high as a twenty-one year-old.
59. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO's FEBRUARY 2013 ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 (2013). A much

smaller number of individuals will continue to buy individual market coverage directly
from an insurer, where the regulations will still apply in many circumstances. See id.
60. If she uses services not covered by the policy, she might spend more, but the list of
covered services is comprehensive and likelihood of using uncovered care reasonably low.
61. ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012)) (adding § 2702 to the Public Health
Service Act ("PHSA")).
62. ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (adding § 2704(a) to the PHSA).
63. ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (adding § 2705 to the PHSA).
64. ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (adding § 2701 to the PHSA).
65. Id.
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Also toward the goal of affordable premiums, the law includes
mechanisms that reduce adverse selection, which occurs when healthy
and sick people sort into different risk pools. When this occurs, the
healthy people pay lower premiums because they enjoy lower health
care spending per person in their risk pools. The unhealthy people
suffer the opposite. To prevent this sorting and reduced interpersonal
distribution, the law's "individual mandate" requires most Americans
to maintain minimum essential coverage or else pay a penalty,
thereby discouraging the healthy from opting out altogether.6
Furthermore, the ACA requires that insurers who sell exchange
policies must create a single pool for most individually insured in a
state, reducing the likelihood of sorting by type of policy.67 It also
establishes risk adjustment and reinsurance mechanisms to level the
playing field at the end of each year if some insurers do, in fact,
attract more or less healthy individuals than others.' Through these
regulations, the ACA attempts to reduce the variability of premiums
among insured and, in turn, the chance that any one individual will be
unable to afford insurance.
Another way the ACA attempts to keep premium rates low is by
limiting insurer profit. Medical-loss ratio regulations require insurers
in the individual market to spend 80% of premium dollars on medical
care and health care quality improvement (as opposed to on
administrative costs or profit).69 The ACA also requires states to
report on premium increases and gives them the opportunity to
exclude particular insurers from the state exchanges if proposed rate
increases in any year are considered too high."
These mechanisms encourage but do not guarantee low
premiums. If the individual mandate fails to encourage healthy
people to buy coverage, adverse selection of less healthy people into
the individual market overall might cause the average spending per
66. ACA §1501,42 U.S.C. § 18091.
67. ACA § 1312, 42 U.S.C. § 18032(c)(1) (excluding members enrolled in
grandfathered plans).
68. ACA §§ 1341-1343, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18061-18063.
69. ACA §§1001, 10101, 42 U.S.C. §300gg-18(b)(1)(A); 45 C.F.R. §158 (2013)
(allowing the Secretary of DHHS to adjust this amount if necessary to stabilize the
market).
70. 45 C.F.R. § 154. It does not, however, explicitly authorize prior approval over
insurers' proposed rate increases (although some states have the authority to do so under
state legislation). See State Approval of Insurance Rate Increases, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/health-insurance-rateapproval-disapproval.aspx (last updated Feb. 2014) ("Over the past 25 years, about two
dozen states gave the state insurance department or commission the legal power of prior
approval, or disapproval, of certain types of rate changes.").
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person and premiums to be high.7' However, Massachusetts, which
implemented a similar style reform in 2006, did not experience
significant adverse selection problems in its individual market.12 And
experts predict that "rate shock" from adverse selection in the
exchanges will likewise be limited." Another possibility is that if too
few insurance companies participate in the individual market
exchanges, there will be insufficient competition to drive down
premiums.74 Or, ineffective state or federal rate review regulation
might leave insurers unchecked in rate setting.75 So far, the number of
insurers participating in most states and year-one premium quotes
suggest these problems are unlikely. 6
The second major way the ACA attempts to lessen financial risk
for individuals buying coverage on an exchange is to limit variable
out-of-pocket spending. It does so by regulating cost sharing for
covered benefits and by mandating certain benefits that plans must
cover, thereby limiting spending on uncovered care. In terms of cost
sharing, most simply, the ACA explicitly caps how much an insured
will have to spend annually on a core set of "essential health
benefits." This cap is $6,350 for an individual or $12,700 for a family
in 2014, or less for lower-income insured.78 The ACA also prohibits
exchange plans from imposing annual or lifetime spending limits on
these essential health benefits. Previously, plans could impose these
71. Some believe individual mandate penalties are not high enough to provoke young,
healthy people to get coverage, which could undermine individual-market risk pooling.
72. See Amitabh Chandra et al., The Importance of the Individual Mandate Evidence from Massachusetts,364 NEw ENG. J. MED. 293, 295 (2011).
73. See, e.g., LINDA J. BLUMBERG & JOHN HOLAHAN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON
FOUND. & URBAN INST., HEALTH STATUS OF EXCHANGE ENROLLEES: PUTTING RATE

SHOCK IN PERSPECTIVE 2, 7 (2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF
/412859-Health-Status-of-Exchange-Enrollees-Putting-Rate-Shock-in-Perspective.pdf
(concluding that the health profile of the exchange population will look similar overall to
the population with employer-sponsored insurance, which is typically considered a good
risk pool).
74. The theory of the exchanges is that insurers will try to offer the lowest premiums
possible to attract customers by limiting operating costs and by negotiating the best rates
with providers. However, if too few insurers participate in a particular state, monopolistic
pricing could occur. Cf James C. Robinson, Consolidation and the Transformation of
Competition in Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 11 (describing
consolidation in state insurance market and suppliers and effect on prices for medical
care).
75. See State Approval of InsuranceRate Increases,supra note 70.
76. For a discussion of reported premium rates, see infra Section IL.B.1.b.
77. ACA § 1302(c), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c) (2012).
78. Rev. Proc. 2013-25, 2013-21 I.R.B. 1110. These amounts are adjusted annually for
cost of living. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2011).
79. ACA § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11(a).
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types of limits on any benefit, where the plan would reimburse up to a
set dollar amount of spending, after which the insured would have to
pay completely out of pocket for continued use of that type of care.s0
For example, once the policy had paid for ten physical therapy visits
or $10,000 in mental health care in a year, the insured would have had
to pay out of pocket for any additional visits or care.
A less straightforward approach to limiting cost sharing is the
ACA's regulation of actuarial value. Actuarial value is the percentage
of total health care spending on covered benefits that a plan
reimburses for a pool of insured." Plans sold on exchanges are
categorized by "metal level" tiers that are defined by the actuarial
value: platinum-level plans have 90% actuarial value, gold-level have
80%, silver-level plans have 70%, and bronze-level have 60%.82 To
illustrate, if one hundred people in a silver-level plan together spent
$1 million on medical care in 2014, the plan must pay for at least
$700,000 of these expenses to have an actuarial value of 70%.
Because these percentages are calculated based on the total amount
of spending for a group of insured people, any individual might pay a
higher or lower percentage of her own medical expenditures, based
on the particular care she uses and the policy's cost-sharing structure
(but only up to the out-of-pocket limits discussed above). Yet, these
levels curb the total combined deductibles, coinsurance, and
copayments that any plan might impose, providing some-ailbeit
imperfect-protection against high spending, even when using
covered items and services.
Finally, the ACA requires that a plan's benefits cover most
major medical needs, limiting an individual's variable out-of-pocket
spending on uncovered services. For example, the ACA mandates
plans cover certain preventive care without any cost sharing.83 It also
requires that "essential health benefits" be included in all nongrandfathered individual-market plans." The Secretary of Health and
Human Services has delegated the specific definition of what is
"essential" to individual states," which will mean that coverage will
be somewhat variable state by state. But the law and regulations set a
80. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Lifetime & Annual Limits, HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/rights/limits/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
81. ACA § 1302(d), 42 U.S.C § 18022(d).
82. Id.
83. ACA § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13. Grandfathered plans are exempted. Id.

84. ACA § 1302,42 U.S.C. § 18022.
85. 45 C.F.R. § 156.100 (2013); see also Robert Pear, Health Care Law Will Let States
Tailor Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at Al (reporting that the Obama
administration gave "states the discretion to specify essential benefits").
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high bar for what categories of care must be covered, including
emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care,
mental health and substance use disorder services, and prescription
drugs.8 6 These essential health benefit requirements, combined with
the actuarial value regulations discussed above, mean that policies
will cover most critical medical needs reasonably comprehensively.
Together, these new regulations significantly reduce the risk of
catastrophic spending.
Finally, because even the level of spending that remains after
these regulations might threaten the financial security of lowerincome households, the ACA provides for premium and cost-sharing
subsidies for anyone earning up to 400% of the federal poverty level
(approximately $46,000 for an individual) and without access to other,
acceptable coverage, such as Medicaid, Medicare, or affordable
insurance from their employer.87 Premium tax credits are set on a
sliding scale with the amount of subsidy decreasing as income
increases." In addition, an individual earning between 100% and
250% of the federal poverty level who buys silver-level coverage on
an exchange is eligible for cost-sharing subsidies.89 Through these
measures, the ACA attempts to limit potential out-of-pocket

86. ACA § 1302,42 U.S.C. § 18022; 45 C.F.R. § 156.110.
87. ACA §§ 1401, 1402 (codified as amended at 26 I.R.C. § 36B (Supp. 2011), 42
U.S.C. § 18071). 400% of the federal poverty level is $45,960 for an individual and $94,200
for a family of four in 2013. See Annual Update of Health and Human Services Property
Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 5182 (Jan. 24, 2013).
88. An individual's contribution for exchange plan premiums is limited to 2% of
income for someone earning 100% of the federal poverty level on a sliding scale to 9.5%
of income for someone earning 300% to 400% of the federal poverty level. ACA § 1401(a)
(codified as amended at 26 I.R.C. § 36B(b) (Supp. 2011)).
89. ACA § 1402(b)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 18071(b)-(c). The cost-sharing limit for spending
on essential health benefits is lower for anyone earning 100-250% of the federal poverty
level. ACA § 1402(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1807(c); DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Health
and Human Services Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2014, 78 Fed. Reg.
15,409, 15,482-83 (March 11, 2013) (using regulatory discretion to reduce eligibility for
cost-sharing subsidies from the statutorily defined levels, limiting eligibility to those
earning up to 250% of the federal poverty level instead of up to 400%, and reducing
amount of cost sharing by one-fifth, instead of one-half, for anyone earning 200-250% of
the federal poverty level). The ACA also provides additional federal subsidies to enable
people earning 100-250% of the federal poverty level to enroll in plans with increased
actuarial value to limit out-of-pocket spending (to 94% for someone earning 100-150% of
the federal poverty level, to 87% for someone earning 150-200% of the federal poverty
level, and to 73% for someone earning 200-250% of the federal poverty level). Id.; see
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: QUESTIONS
ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES 2-3 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamily

foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7962-02.pdf.
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spending additionally for households with incomes below 400% of the
federal poverty level.
b.

ProjectedSpending and FinancialRisk

These ACA regulations reshape individual market health
insurance in ways that significantly diminish financial risk from health
care spending. The following scenario considers how much an
individual earning median household income who buys an average
(silver-level) plan on an individual market exchange might spend
annually on health care, even in a year of bad health.' It reveals that
this individual remains vulnerable to high premiums and thus baseline
spending could cause financial strain. But her variable costs will be
limited and catastrophic risk largely eliminated.
Early projections and studies of 2014 reported premium rates
indicate the likely cost of coverage and the variability of such
premiums across states and age groups." The RAND Corporation
projected that over the next few years, premiums in the individual
market might decline as a result of the ACA." They estimate the
weighted-average premium for an individual will be just over $3,000
in 2016, when accounting for subsidies.93

90. The median household income is based on a household under age sixty-five, not
for one with specific demographic attributes. See discussion supra note 29. Although the
author used feminine pronouns throughout for narrative simplicity, the estimates below
are based on an average member of the insured group, not tailored based on gender.
91. See, e.g., AVALERE HEALTH, AVALERE ANALYSIS OF EXCHANGES RATES FOR
2014, at 2 (2013); DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INSURANCE
MARKETPLACE PREMIUMS FOR 2014, at 13-14 (2013); CHRISTINE EIBNER ET AL., RAND
CORP., THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS:
SIMULATING THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION 35-36 (2013).
92. EIBNER ET AL., supra note 91. This study, undertaken for the Department of
Health and Human Services to estimate individual market premiums under a number of
conditions, uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and the Kaiser Family Foundation/Health
Research and Educational Trust Survey of Employer Benefits. The researchers use a
"utility maximization approach," assuming (likely overly optimistically) that families will
choose a plan that maximizes their utility. Id. at 6-7. They also assume that individual
mandates are perfectly enforced and that states will expand their Medicaid programs. Id.
at 16, 20.
93. Id. at 23, 45. The total estimated premium is nearly $5,000, when including federal
tax credits. Id. at 46. Actual premiums reported so far appear to be somewhat lower than
the RAND estimates. RAND attributes this discrepancy to the fact that reported
premiums are for 2014 and their estimates are for 2016, as well as a number of other
factors, including potential gaming by insurers to set prices low at first to gain market
share and that the data on nongroup premiums prior to the ACA, on which they base their
analysis, are limited. Id. at 16-18.
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Reported actual rates for 2014 are roughly in accord with the
RAND projections. A study by Avalere Health estimates an average
annual silver-level plan premium of just over $4,000 annually ($336
per month).94 Many enrollees are estimated to qualify for premium
subsidies that will pay for part of this amount.95 A Department of
Health and Human Services study, which examines the thirty-six
states with federally run or supported exchanges, reported a similar
weighted average across these states.96 Based on these estimates,
premiums would consume on average about 7% of the median
household income or 11% of adjusted gross income.
The Avalere study also illustrates the effects of age-rating bands
(i.e., the allowed variation of premiums by age') by separately
reporting average silver-level plan premiums for twenty-one, forty,
and sixty year-olds. For the twenty-one year-old, the average annual
premium is $3,252.98 For a forty year-old, the average is $3,924

annually. 99 For a sixty year-old, the average premium is considerably
higher: $7,380 annually, with premiums as high as $9,168 annually in
Connecticut." In the worst-case reported, a sixty year-old in
Connecticut could spend as much as 16% of median household
income (26% of adjusted gross income) on premiums.
Variable out-of-pocket cost sharing is more limited under the
ACA regulations than before, but could still be substantial for some
people who experience a year of bad health. With respect to cost
sharing for covered services, the ACA limits an individual's spending
to $6,350.101 Most people will not reach this maximum. In fact, to
spend this much with a silver-level plan, someone will have to have
94. AVALERE HEALTH, supra note 91, at 3 (examining public rate filings released in
twelve states, eight with state-run and four with federally run exchanges, including
California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Indiana, Maryland, New York, Ohio,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington). The bronze-level plan
estimate is $3,288, or $274 per month. Id.
95. Id. at 1.
96. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 91, at 13-14 (reporting the
weighted average premiums in forty-eight states to be $328 per month in the secondlowest cost silver plan ($3,936 annually)). For a twenty-seven year-old buying the secondcheapest silver-level plan, this study estimates premiums to be $214 on average, ranging
from $161 in Tennessee to $342 in Wyoming. Id. at 8.
97. See supra note 64-65 and accompanying text.
98. AVALERE HEALTH, supra note 91, at 2.
99. Id. These premiums vary geographically; for example, in New York the average
premium for a forty year-old is $5,328 annually, because age rating is prohibited and
younger enrollees thus subsidize older ones. Id.
100. Id. Avalere reports a low premium of $411 per month ($4,932 annually) in
Vermont, where age rating is prohibited so that older enrollees do not pay more. Id.
101. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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consumed enough medical care over the year to be in the top third of
overall health care spenders.102
One study estimated that if the ACA had been in place in
between 2001 and 2008, average annual out-of-pocket cost sharing
would have been $280 less, with fifty-five to sixty-four year-olds
saving nearly $600 on average per year.103 Perhaps more importantly,
the ACA would have significantly reduced the threat of annual cost
sharing greater than $4,000 for lower-income families,'" and would
have reduced by three-quarters the likelihood of expenditures over
$6,000 for anyone. 05 As a result of its regulations, the ACA will thus
reduce variable spending for the typical spender and minimize
catastrophic risk for most households.
Table 1 summarizes the picture of baseline and variable spending
in this scenario, illustrating the maximum amount a forty year-old and
sixty year-old who buy a silver-level policy on the exchange might
have to spend out of pocket, in a year of relatively poor health. As
illustrated in the first row, a forty year-old with average premiums
could spend over $10,000 in a year, which is nearly 18% of median
household income or nearly 30% of median adjusted gross income.'*

102. With actuarial value of 70%, enrollees pay only 30% of total costs on average for
a group of insured. If an individual pays about the average share of total costs experienced
among enrollees in a silver-level plan, she will have to have incurred $21,000 total in
medical care spending over the year for her own out-of-pocket share to be $6,350 (30% of
$21,165). Models suggest a relatively high deductible silver-level plan might have a $4,200
deductible and 20% coinsurance. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WHAT THE
ACTUARIAL VALUES IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT MEAN 4 (2011) (modeling
possible cost-sharing designs with different metal levels). This plan would still require
nearly $15,000 in total spending to incur $6,350 in cost sharing (the first $4,200 plus 20% of
the next $10,750). $15,000 per year in expenditures still puts the individual into the top
one-third of individual spenders. NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., supra note 9, at
3 (citing that the top 30% spent $12,265 in 2009 which, with 4% growth per year, would be
$14,922 in 2014 (4% is the approximate average annual level of projected health care cost
growth for 2009-2014. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL
HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2011-2021, at 1 (2011)).

103. See Steven C. Hill, Individual Insurance Benefits to Be Available Under Health
Reform Would Have Cut Out-of-Pocket Spending in 2001-08, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1349, 1349,
1354 (2012).
104. See id. at 1354 (defining lower-income as under 400% of the federal poverty
level).
105. See id. (reducing incidence from 2.6% of all adults with individual coverage to
0.6% but not eliminating the possibility because of out-of network charges and uncovered
services).
106. These percentages are a rough estimate and might be somewhat higher or lower
depending on individual characteristics of exchange enrollees. See discussion supra notes
29 and 57. For example, if an individual lives in New York, the state with highest reported
premiums for a forty year-old, her total spending on covered items could be $11,678
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She could also incur some, although likely limited, spending on items
or services not covered by her policy (and thus not mandated as
essential health benefits) or on services provided by doctors out of
her network. This type of spending on uncovered benefits is less likely
in exchange plans than in other plans because of the essential health
benefit coverage requirements.
A sixty year-old could spend more. Even with average premiums
($7,380), she could spend a quarter of median household income on
out-of-pocket health care costs. Living in a state like Connecticut with
relatively high premiums, she might spend even more ($9,168 in
premiums and $6,350 in cost sharing). But even in this worst-case
scenario with high baseline costs and high health care utilization, total
spending is not unlimited, thus minimizing catastrophic risk to some
degree.

($5,328 in average premiums for a forty year-old in New York plus $6,350 in cost sharing).
AVALERE HEALTH, supra note 91, at 1, 2.
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Table 1. Maximum Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Spending in Scenario
Considering Person with Average Silver Coverage from Individual
Market Exchange (forty and sixty year-old)
Determinants of 00? Spen

g

Annual
Premium

Total

M

Possible

Average
Sharing

CAre

OOP
Spendin*

Income***

$10,274

18%

$13,730

24%

Plans must
Forty
year-old

$3,924

cover:
Essential
Health
Benefits
$6,350
limit on
Essential
Health
Benefits

sity

year-old

$7,380

Preventive
Health
Services with
no cost
sharing

*Low risk of
spending on
uncovered
care
*

Source: Avalere Health LLC Analysis of Exchanges Rates for 2014 (2013).

** Estimates exclude spending on uncovered items and services, which are relatively low in this
scenario because of the mandated coverage of essential health benefits.
*** Percentage estimates are based on the median household income for those under age sixtyfive.

This scenario illustrates the top possible spending for an
individual with average silver-level exchange coverage because it
assumes the insured earns too much to be eligible for premiums and
cost-sharing subsidies. Income above 400% of the federal poverty
level completely disqualifies someone from subsidies." If the insured
were the matriarch of a family of four, median household income
would be just under 250% of the federal poverty level, which would
qualify the family for premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies.'

107. In response, people with income just above this level might attempt to reduce
earnings, if possible, to qualify for subsidies.
108. These examples assume her employer did not offer coverage that is considered
"affordable" (premiums less than 9.5% of income) and "minimum value" (actuarial value
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They would pay no more than about 8% of income,
$4,500 per year, on premiums for all four people,
ACA's sliding scale.'09 In addition, cost sharing for
be reduced to 80% of the family limits discussed

[Vol. 92

or approximately
according to the
the family would
above (just over

$10,000).110

These examples illustrate that the ACA has attempted to
increase financial security for people buying coverage on an exchange
by limiting the tail of spending exposure and thus catastrophic risk.
This policy vision of financial security is one where an individual
might still incur significant health care spending over the course of a
year on premiums and cost sharing, especially if in bad health, but,
even in the worst case, will not face unbounded spending on essential
care."' Thus, the ACA's working regulatory definition of financial
security for this group is one of low catastrophic risk.
2. Worker with Employer-Sponsored Insurance Coverage
Although the ACA revamps the individual insurance market, it
preserves much of ESI as is. About 165 million individuals will likely
have coverage through an employer after full implementation of the
ACA, up slightly from current numbers.112 Most of these insured
employees will be in an employer "self-funded" plan."' This Section
considers a scenario with a person earning a median household
income and working for a large employer with such a self-funded
plan.114

of at least 60%), which would disqualify her for subsidies. ACA § 1401(a) (codified as
amended at 26 I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 2011)).
109. ACA § 1401(a) (codified as amended at 26 I.R.C. § 36B(b)) (showing contribution
of 8.05% for someone earning 250% of the federal poverty level).
110. ACA § 1402(c)(1)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. 18071(c)(1)(A) (2012); DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., Health and Human Services Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters
for 2014, 78 Fed. Reg. 15,409, 15,482-83 (Mar. 11, 2013) (reducing cost sharing by one-fifth
for someone earning between 200-250% of the federal poverty level).
111. The potential for unbounded spending still exists when using care that is not
considered an "essential health benefit" or is not covered under the plan.
112. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 59, at 1 (predicting that in 2019, 165
million Americans will receive health insurance from an employer, compared to 154
million Americans who received health insurance from an employer in 2013).
113. See id.

114. As noted above, median income for such an individual is likely to be somewhat
higher than for an individual in an exchange plan. But this analysis uses overall median
household income in both scenarios because the income of exchange enrollees is not yet
known. See supra note 29.
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People with ESI have historically been more sheltered than other
insured from financial risk caused by health care spending." Going
forward, however, their continued protection is not guaranteed. This
effect flows from a central feature of the ACA: it perpetuates a preACA practice of deference to employers with respect to the terms of
their benefits for employees, as discussed above with regard to
ERISA preemption." 6 That is, rather than prescribing how health
insurance should promote financial security for people with ESI, the
ACA inserts a placeholder for an employer's definition. Some trends
suggest that ESI is already becoming less comprehensive, due to
increased cost sharing and the growing adoption of high deductible
health plans and more limited networks of providers.117 For these
reasons and because ESI plans are subject to few mandated benefits,
employees could find themselves subject to especially high spending
on uncovered benefits.
a. Regulation of Employer-SponsoredInsurance Under the
ACA

Many of the ACA financial security regulations do not apply to
large-group ESI for both practical and political reasons.1 Practically,
employer plans have historically offered fairly solid coverage,
protecting employees well from high out-of-pocket spending. Large
employers have been able to exert bargaining power against insurers,
which has kept prices low. Employer plans have also provided
beneficiaries relatively comprehensive benefits, limiting insureds'
spending on uncovered goods and services." 9 In fact, the ACA directs
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to model the essential
health benefits for exchange plans after coverage in employer plans. 120
Large workplaces generally create good risk pools with both healthy
and sick people so that the average cost per person is stable (and, as
noted above, under HIPAA, employers are not permitted to treat
employees differently or charge them more based on individual

115. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Insurance,
2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23 (2001) (concluding that the employment-based
coverage model functions well).
116. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
117. See KFF & HRET ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 51, at 65 (showing increase in
enrollment by covered workers in high-deductible health plans from 1999 until 2013).
118. See Jost, supranote 54, at 28-29.
119. Id. at 58; see also Hyman & Hall, supra note 115, at 31 (explaining that employerbased coverage is more comprehensive, enabled by substantial tax subsidies).
120. ACA § 1302(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012.).
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health statusl 21). Finally, employers have typically paid a large part of
the premium costs for employees' plans, 22 resulting in low employee
out-of-pocket premium contributions. 2 1
Politically, it was more feasible to pass legislation that was
amenable to the business community lobby. Thus, deference to
employers was likely critical to the ACA's passage.
For these reasons, the ACA leaves employer plans exempt from
many ACA regulations, banking perhaps on the assumption that
employers will continue to offer relatively comprehensive coverage.
Most importantly, the essential health benefit requirements do not
apply to large-group or self-funded plans.124 This means that if
employers decide not to cover commonly used or expensive items or
services, employees will face high out-of-pocket spending for
uncovered care.
Yet, some new financial protections to limit variable spending do
extend into this mostly unregulated space, evincing that these
protections were deemed a crucial part of the ACA's regulations for
all insured and thus worth the political battle. Most importantly, the
ACA extends out-of-pocket spending limits and the prohibition of
annual coverage limits on essential health benefits to all plans,12
including self-funded plans.'26 Most plans cover these benefits and will
now have to offer them on these new terms or, alternatively,
discontinue offering them. In addition, all plans, apart from
grandfathered plans, are required to cover preventive health services

without cost sharing.127
The ACA generally provides no subsidies to low-income
individuals for premiums or cost sharing in employer plans. But, if an
employer's plan is either not "affordable" (premiums exceed 9.5% of
income) or does not provide "minimum value" (actuarial value of at
least 6%), a lower-income employee can buy subsidized coverage on
121. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (forbidding "discrimination against individual participants
and beneficiaries based on health status").
122. See KFF & HRET ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 51, at 70 (reporting premium
contributions by workers on average are eighteen to 20% of total premium costs, the rest
of which is paid for by the employer).

123. Id.
124. ACA § 1201,42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6; ACA § 1301, 42 U.S.C. § 18021.
125. ACA § 1302(c), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c); DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVS.,

Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, Final
Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,837 (2013) (interpreting the out-of-pocket maximums as
applying to all non-grandfathered plans).
126. ACA § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11(a).
127. ACA § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13.
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the individual-market exchanges. 128 So, for lower-income employees,
there is an escape hatch from limited employer plans, and premiums
are effectively limited to 9.5% of income. Higher-income employees
could also choose to buy exchange plans, but they would not receive
subsidies. Plus, they would lose the value of the employer's
contribution toward their health care benefits and the preferential tax
treatment of their own contributions, which can be financed with pretax dollars. Thus, an employer plan would have to be especially lowvalue for a higher-income employee to opt out.
b. Projected Spending and FinancialRisk
Baseline out-of-pocket spending on premiums is low for most
people with ESI. Average annual premiums for ESI in 2013 were
$5,884 for single coverage and $16,351 for family coverage, 129 but most
of this spending is invisible to the workers. An employee pays on
average only $1,065 annually for single coverage in a large-group
health plan.130 Only about one-quarter pays $1,400 or more per year
for premiums,1 31
' amounts far from "unaffordable" under the terms of
the ACA.
Looking at premiums this way, however, is somewhat misleading.
The employer subsidizes the difference between the employee
contribution and the actual cost of coverage. Health insurance
premiums comprise a high and increasing share of total employee
compensation and are blamed as a cause of wage stagnation and, in
recent years, a decline in real median household income.13 2 Thus, the
median income earner might earn higher wages if her employer were
not paying for her health insurance; she would also pay more for
health insurance coverage. This analysis considers the employee's
share of spending and current household median income in a static
state. This approach offers a realistic snapshot of the current lived
experience for an employee, but somewhat underestimates the effect
of health care costs on disposable income. Based on these
128. ACA § 1401(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 2011))
(defining a lower-income employee as one with income under 400% of the federal poverty
level).
129. KFF & HRET ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 51, at 20. These relatively high
premiums are indicative of the typical comprehensiveness of benefits and coverage.
130. Id. at 77.
131. Id. at 84.
132. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Central Challenge in US. Health Policy, N.Y.
TIMES ECONOMIx BLOG, at fig.5 (Aug. 30, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs
.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/the-central-challenge-in-u-s-health-policy/?emc=edit_tnt_20130
830&tntemail0=y&_r=1 (showing a fall in real median income since 2008).
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assumptions, a typical employee with median household income pays
a relatively small part of her take-home pay for health insurance
coverage.
Out-of-pocket cost sharing on covered benefits is also relatively
low, as compared to other forms of health insurance. Most employees
have a plan with a deductible, which they must pay out of pocket
before coverage begins.'33 The average deductible is $884 in largefirm plans; only 8% of people in large-firm ESI have a deductible of
$2,000 or more.'34 In addition to the ACA's limits on cost sharing on
essential health benefits, most plans include their own annual costsharing maximums on all plan benefits, many of which are even lower
than the ACA limits. 35
Nevertheless, some workers still face potentially high cost
sharing. For example, one study shows that people with chronic
diseases face higher spending in ESI plans because they use more
prescription drugs and pay a higher percentage of the cost of these
drugs than they would for other benefits. 3 6 Some plans do not count
spending on prescription drugs toward cost-sharing maximums.' 37
Further, about one-quarter of workers with single coverage have a
cost-sharing limit over $5,000 or none at all.13 With no limit, someone
might spend an uncapped amount on cost sharing for benefits that are
covered by their plan but are not essential health benefits, for which
the ACA limits do not apply. For example, an employer plan might
include expensive fertility treatment but only cover up to $10,000 on
this treatment in a year. Because this treatment is not an essential
health benefit subject to ACA regulations, the employer fully dictates
the extent of coverage and the insured worker will have to pay all of
the costs of fertility treatment after the first $10,000. To be sure, this
feature of the ESI plans does not make employees any worse off than
exchange enrollees, for whom the ACA's cost-sharing limits likewise
only apply to essential health benefits. But a worker in an ESI plan
133. KFF & HRET ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 51, at 105.
134. Id. at 107, 109. Fifteen percent of workers with ESI over all have a deductible of
$2,000 or more. Id. at 109.
135. Id. at 126-27 (reporting that nearly 80% of single coverage plans with an out-ofpocket maximum have limits of $3,000 per year or less, less than half of the ACA limits).
136. See Jean M. Abraham et al., Gauging the Generosity of Employer-Sponsored
Insurance:Differences Between Households with and Without a Chronic Condition (NBER
Working Paper No. 17232, 2011) (finding that the chronically ill have "less generous
insurance" than those who are not chronically ill).
137. KFF & HRET ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 51, at 102.
138. Id. at 126-27 (reporting 12% have no maximum, 8% have a maximum between
$5,000 and $5,999 and 4% have a maximum of $6,000 or more).
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might be more likely to start expensive treatment regiments that are
initially covered by their generous policies, only to later discover the
limitation in the policy's coverage, unless the policy's terms of
coverage are transparent.
Where employees in employer plans are potentially worse off,
however, is with regard to catastrophic spending risk: their plans are
not required to cover essential health benefits at all, increasing their
potential of needing care that is not covered by the plan. In fact, the
ACA creates an incentive for employers not to cover these essential
health benefits, by requiring that to the extent they do cover them,
they may not impose annual and lifetime caps and must adhere to the
out-of-pocket spending limits under the ACA.139 At a time when
employers are scaling back coverage, these requirements might make
covering these benefits too expensive. For uncovered benefits, the
insured must pay completely out of pocket for use of services and
items with no limit at all to spending. For example, the ACA includes
prescription drugs as an essential health benefit.14 0 An employer
might choose to exclude prescription drug coverage from its ESI plan
altogether, leaving the employee to pay for all prescription drugs
costs out of pocket.
Table 2 maps an illustrative scenario of what an employee with a
median household income and average employer coverage could
spend out of pocket in a year of bad health. As discussed above, the
likely premiums are low compared to exchange plans, and the costsharing limits are similar with regard to essential health benefits,
although potentially high with regard to non-essential ones. This
means that total spending on premiums and "essential" covered
benefits is lower than for exchange enrollees (approximately 13% of
income or just over 20% of adjusted gross income). The main
difference is that without mandated coverage of essential health
benefits, an employee could be exposed to significant financial risk if
her employer chooses not to cover commonly used or expensive
categories of necessary care.

139. ACA § 1302(c), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c) (2012.); DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and
Accreditation, Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,837 (Feb 25., 2013) (interpreting the
out-of-pocket maximums as applying to all non-grandfathered plans).
140. ACA § 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022.
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Table 2: Maximum Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Spending in Scenario
Considering Worker with Average Employee Coverage
Determinants of OOP Spending
Average
Uncovered

'
Tot'i
Maximuam
PnoveesibMleai
Percentage of

Premium*

Spjending

Annual

Cost Sharing Care

OP

Income**

$7,415
+
unlimited

13%
+ unlimited

Plans must
cover:

Employee

$6,350 limit
on Essential
Health

with Single $1,065

Benefits, if

Coverage

covered

Preventive
Health
Services with
no cost
sharing

spending

spending on

Not required

on

uncovered

to cover

uncovered

care

care
Essential
Health
Benefits * risk
of spending on
uncovered
essentialcare

Based on costs of top quarter of plans in KFF & HRET 2013 Annual Survey and on employee
share of premium costs. Could be considerably higher if employer does not subsidize premiums.
** Percentage estimates are based on the median household income for those under age sixtyfive.
*

The situation could be worse if the insured is the sole
breadwinner for a family of four. In contrast to the family with the
exchange plan discussed above, larger family size does not reduce
financial insecurity.'41 ESI premiums are typically higher for family
coverage than for individual coverage.142 But the Internal Revenue
Service concluded it will look only at the premium cost for an
individual employee plan, not at the higher cost of coverage for a
family, to determine if premiums exceed the "affordability" threshold
of 9.5% of income triggering eligibility for exchange subsidies.143 This
means that if an employee can buy a policy for herself that costs 7%
141. This reality is arguably due to misinterpretation of the ACA rule allowing a
person access to exchange subsidies if employer coverage premiums are "unaffordable,"
or exceed 9.5% of income. ACA § 1401(a), 26 I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C) (2012).
142. Even though higher, the premiums typically rise at a rate less than linear with
family size, which means that individual employees in effect subsidize employees with
families in the risk pool.
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c) (2013).
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of her income but one for her whole family would cost 15% of her
income, the IRS considers the policy affordable. Over one-third of all
workers pay premiums that would be "unaffordable" for a family with
median household income if family premiums were considered.'"
These examples illustrate that the ACA has attempted to
preserve the current structure of ESI to a large degree, in line with
earlier health insurance policy. The law extends limits on cost sharing
for essential health benefits to employer coverage, but renders these
limits a paper tiger without also mandating coverage of these essential
benefits. Thus, the ACA's working regulatory definition of financial
security for this group varies based on what an employer decides to
cover in its employee plan. Based on the current state of ESI, the
definition is typically one of low baseline spending, low variable
spending, and low catastrophic risk. In effect, ESI is now the most
protective form of insurance among those examined here, but its
protections are not guaranteed going forward.
3. Retiree with Medicare and Medigap
Over sixty million individuals are expected to have Medicare
coverage after full ACA implementation, 145 Most of whom will be
over the age of sixty-five." Considering how the ACA will affect
members of this last group is especially complex because of the
variability in Medicare coverage and the fact that most people have
supplemental coverage. The first scenario below briefly considers a
retiree with Original, or "fee-for-service," Medicare coverage, plus
Medicare drug coverage. The second scenario considers the same
individual also with "Medigap," a private insurance plan for
supplemental medical coverage. This second scenario, with
supplemental coverage, is more illustrative of the financial risk faced
by most retirees and is the primary focus of this analysis.

144. KFF & HRET ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 51, at 84 (estimating 9% pay
between $5,497 and $6,392 per year and 21% pay $6,392 per year or more for family
coverage).
145. THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HosP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST
FUNDS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL
HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST
FUNDS 198 (2013) [hereinafter BDS. OF TRS. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT] (estimating

64,272,000 individuals will be covered by Part A Hospital Insurance and/or Part B or D
Supplemental Medical Insurance in 2020).
146. These estimates assume the eligibility age does not increase. A minority of
Medicare enrollees are disabled individuals under age sixty-five. In 2012, of 50.7 million
Medicare beneficiaries, 42.1 million were over age sixty-five and 8.5 million were disabled.
Id. at 6.
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The analysis reveals two regulatory conceptions of financial
security protection for retirees, envisioned by Medicare and
reinforced by the ACA. The first, for someone with only Original
Medicare, involves low baseline spending but a high potential for
variable spending and uncapped catastrophic risk due to high cost
sharing. In response to this high cost sharing and probably equally to
confusion caused by the opacity of Medicare coverage, 90% of
retirees obtain supplemental coverage to fill in the gaps.147 By buying
supplemental coverage, retirees choose a definition of financial
security based on higher baseline costs in return for low potential
variable spending and catastrophic risk. Retirees thus must choose
between high catastrophic risk or high baseline spending, and most
opt for the latter.
Medicare finances about one-half of total health care costs for
enrollees through an array of different programs that have been
pieced together over time.148 Original Medicare is comprised of two
parts: Part A, which pays mostly for hospital and inpatient care, and
Part B Supplementary Medical Insurance, which pays primarily for
outpatient care.149 For most people, enrollment in Part A is automatic
and free."o Part B enrollment costs start at $104.90 per month for
anyone earning $85,000 or less and increase on a sliding scale."' Both
of these parts of Original Medicare have high and unlimited out-ofpocket cost sharing. For example, beneficiaries pay a deductible for a
hospital stay of $1,216 for the first 60 days.152 For longer stays,
beneficiaries must pay $304 per day for days 61 to 90, $608 per day for
days 91 to 150, and all costs after 150 days.153 For outpatient care,
beneficiaries pay a 20% coinsurance rate for most services."
Low-income subsidies for Medicare enrollees are much more
limited than for exchange enrollees. Enrollees earning below 135% of
147. See JULIETrE CUBANSKI ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE
CHARTBOOK 60 (4th ed. 2010), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files
.wordpress.com/2013/01/8103.pdf (reporting that Medicare finances 48% of total costs of
health care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries).
148. See id. at 70.
149. Id. at 20.
150. Id. at 22. Part A is premium-free if an individual or spouse worked forty or more
quarters of Medicare-covered employment where they contributed Medicare payroll
https://www.extendhealth.com
taxes. Medicare Part A, EXTENDHEALTH.COM,
/medicare/part-a (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
151. Medicare 2013 & 2014 Costs at a Glance, MEDICARE.GOv, http://www.medicare
.gov/your-medicare-costs/costs-at-a-glance/costs-at-glance.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
152. Id.
153. Id.

154. Id.
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the federal poverty level are dually eligible for Medicaid, which
subsidizes their Medicare premiums and cost sharing."' This
eligibility level is just under $16,000 for an individual and about
$21,500 for a couple.156 In addition, an enrollee must have extremely
low asset levels,57 which means those who qualify are already in a
tenuous financial position.
Ninety percent of retirees obtain supplemental medical coverage
to fill in Medicare coverage gaps.15' For about one-fifth of retirees,
this coverage is through a Medigap private supplemental plan. 15 9
Those with Medigap pay higher premiums than retirees with other
forms of supplemental coverage but they face little variable spending
and catastrophic risk." This means that considering Medigap in the
scenario below slightly overestimates premiums and underestimates
the potential for variable spending as compared to other types of
supplemental plans, such as retiree coverage through an employer.
Medigap plans are highly regulated private insurance plans with
standardized terms that differ by plan types, identified by letter (AN). 16 1 Federal regulation determines what a plan must cover to be
classified and sold as each letter type.162 Nearly one-half of all
Medigap enrollees choose the most popular plan ("Plan F"),163 which
entirely covers Medicare Parts A and B cost sharing.1" Even though
155. Seniors
&
Medicare and
Medicaid Enrollees, MEDICAID.GOV,
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Population/MedicareMedicaid-Enrollees-Dual-Eligibles/Seniors-and-Medicare-and-Medicaid-Enrollees.html
(last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
156. Id. (reporting a monthly income of $1,333 for an individual and $1,790 for a couple
for the Qualifying Individual program, which has the highest levels of eligibility for
Medicaid dual-eligibility subsidies).
157. Id. (reporting asset limits of $7,160 per individual and $10,750 per couple to
qualify).
158. CUBANSKI ET AL., supra note 147, at 60.
159. Id.
160. Those with Medigap supplemental coverage face the greatest total out-of-pocket
exposure among all retirees, even more than those with no supplemental coverage, who
are spared premium costs and may consume less care than people with supplemental
coverage do. See Dana P. Goldman & Julie M. Zissimopoulos, High Out-of-Pocket Health
Care Spending by the Elderly, 32 HEALTH AFF. 194, 198 (2013).
161. ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION OFFICE OF HEALTH POLICY,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE REPORT: VARIATION AND TRENDS IN
MEDIGAP PREMIUMS 6 (2011).
162. Id.
163. AM.'S HEALTH INS. PLANS, MEDIGAP: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOw 3 fig.3
(2011), www.ahip.org/MedigapWhatYouNeedtoKnow/ (reporting 45% of beneficiaries
enrolled in Plan F and 17% enrolled in Plan C, which is similar to plan F, in 2009).
164. See KATHRYN LINEHAN, NAT'L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 845,
RECENT PROPOSALS TO LIMIT MEDIGAP COVERAGE AND MODIFY MEDICARE COST
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some plans are not as comprehensive, most cover a majority of the
cost sharing.165 Medigap Plan F had average monthly premiums of
$171 in 2010.166 If premium growth rates remained constant from the
decade prior,167 the 2014 premiums would be just over $200. The
estimates in Table 3B below are based on this premium estimate, but
spending might be somewhat lower or higher based on plan type,
geography, or individual characteristics.1 68
Ninety percent of Medicare enrollees also have prescription drug
coverage,169 mostly through the Medicare Part D prescription drug
benefit. 7 o The average weighted monthly Part D plan premium was
projected at just over $40 in 2013.171 About 40% of all Part D
enrollees, who have incomes below 150% of the federal poverty level
and very low assets, receive additional federal assistance with
premiums.172 Cost sharing in Part D has been significant but is
decreasing under the ACA, as discussed below.

SHARING 5 (2012). Some Plan F beneficiaries opt for a "high deductible" option where

they pay the first $2,000 in expenditures after which the Medigap plan covers all costs. Id.
165. ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION OFFICE OF HEALTH POLICY,
supra note 161, at 7 (showing coverage by plan type).
166. Id. at 4 (reporting enrollment-weighted premiums).
167. Id. (reporting Medigap premiums grew on average 3.8% per year from 20012010).
168. Id. at 5, 16-17. The rates vary significantly by state, from a low in 2010 of $129 on
average in Michigan to $219 in New York. Id. at 5. Insurers can charge older people more,
offer discounts for women, non-smokers, or married people, and can medically underwrite
people who do not enroll in an open-enrollment period. Most policies are "attained-age
rated," which means that premiums vary based on the age of the enrollee, getting
relatively higher as an individual gets older. Id. at 9; Cost of Medigap Policies,
MEDICARE.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/find-a-plan/staticpages/learn/how-insurancecompanies-price-policies.aspx#;return%20false (last visited May. 7, 2014).
169. CUBANSKI ET AL., supra note 147, at 34 fig.3.1. In 2010, about 60% had a
Medicare Part D plan for prescription drugs, nearly 20% had coverage through an ESI
retiree plan, and 13% had some other coverage. Id.
170. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 (2012)).
171. JACK HOADLEY ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE PART
D: A FIRST LOOK AT PART D PLAN OFFERINGS IN 2013, at 2 (2012) (estimating 2013
premium weighted by enrollment, based on 2012 enrollment). Premiums for the four most

popular plans, which together accounted for nearly 50% of the enrollee population in
2013, ranged from $18.50 per month to $43.77 per month. Id. at 7.
172. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SPENDING PATTERNS FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
UNDER MEDICARE PART D 2 (2011) (reporting that 40% of enrollees receive low-income
subsidies); GRETCHEN JACOBSON ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
MEDICARE'S ROLE FOR DUAL ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES 13 (2012) (describing
qualification criteria for the Low-Income Subsidy Program, including that assets must be
under $11,570).
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Regulation of Medicare Under the ACA

The ACA did not alter the structure of Medicare overall but
made several changes to the program design that will reduce out-ofpocket spending for Medicare beneficiaries."' The most important
change is the elimination of the Part D "donut hole" coverage gap,
which will decrease cost sharing on prescription drugs by $43 billion
over ten years.174 The donut hole was a gap in coverage that occurred
after a beneficiary spent a certain amount on benefits.'75 Beneficiaries
used to be responsible for 100% of total prescription drug costs in this
donut hole until reaching a threshold for catastrophic coverage.17 6 The
ACA reduces this share from 100% to 25% of total costs by 2020.177
Above the catastrophic threshold, the beneficiary pays only 5% of
costs out of pocket and the plan pays the rest.178 One study estimates
that the ACA will decrease out-of-pocket spending for high
prescription drug spenders by as much as one-third, but will have
little impact on someone with median expenditures.1 7 9

173. See ROBERT BERENSON & JOHN HOLAHAN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND.
& URBAN INST., How WILL THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
AFFECT SENIORS?: TIMELY ANALYSIS OF HEALTH POLICY ISSUES 1-2 (2010). Some
changes could increase out-of-pocket spending, but total spending on net is likely to
decrease. See id.
174. See id. at 2. Part D led to a reduction of $180 in annual out-of-pocket costs for the
median participant and $800 at the ninetieth percentile. GARY V. ENGELHARDT &
JONATHAN GRUBER, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, Bos. COLL., DOES MEDICARE PART D
PROTECT THE ELDERLY FROM FINANCIAL RISK? 3-4 (2011), available at
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/IB 11-8-508.pdf.
175. Historically, the initial coverage limit has ranged from $2,250 to $2,970 in total
drug spending. 2014 Medicare Part D Outlook, Q1MEDICARE.COM, http://www
.qlmedicare.com/PartD-The-MedicarePartDOutlookAllYears.php (last visited Jan. 28,
2014).
176. Id. A beneficiary will have paid up to $4,550 in out-of-pocket spending, up to this
point in 2014, before the new rules take effect. Id. Part of this amount may be paid by
pharmaceutical companies, depending on what drugs an individual uses. Id.
177. ACA § 3301, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(b)(2)(C)-(D) (2012). During the transition
period until 2020, the ACA provides that the Medicare plan will increasingly subsidize
generic and brand drug spending in the donut hole and drug manufacturers will provide a
50% discount on brand drugs. MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT:
CLOSING
THE
DOUGHNUT
HOLE
1-2, available at http://www.medicare
rights.org/pdf/Closing-the-Doughnut-Hole-Chart.pdf (last modified Jan. 1, 2014).
178. JACK HOADLEY ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ANALYSIS OF
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS IN 2012 AND KEY TRENDS SINCE 2006, at 11
fig.1 (2012) (depicting cost sharing in Part D plans including catastrophic coverage).
179. See Paul Fronstin et al., Notes: The Impact of Repealing PPACA on Savings
Needed for Health Expenses for Persons Eligible for Medicare,EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST.,
Aug. 2011, at 3 (basing estimates on spending for someone in the ninetieth percentile of
drug spenders). Because the plan will be paying for a greater share of the costs of drugs,
premiums may increase somewhat.
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To illustrate what this change will mean, a Part D beneficiary will
be responsible for three components of cost sharing by 2020: (1) a
deductible; (2) 25% of costs in the coverage gap; and (3) 5% of drug
costs thereafter."so If these new rules were in effect now, a beneficiary
could spend as much as: (1) $310 on the deductible; (2) $1,536
through the former donut hole (25% of the amount of spending
above the deductible up to the catastrophic limit); and (3) 5% of any
spending over the catastrophic limit ($6,455 in total spending).
Maximum cost sharing would be just under $1,850 up to the
catastrophic level and then 5% thereafter.
The top prescription drug users still bear some catastrophic
spending risk. About 3% of non-low-income beneficiaries reach the
catastrophic level,81 mostly because of spending on specialty drugs
for chronic conditions. 82 For those who reached the catastrophic
threshold, nearly one-half of their total drug expenditures occur
above that threshold.183 But because the beneficiary's out-of-pocket
share of these expenditures is so low, the beneficiary spends on
average just under $300 out of pocket above the catastrophic level.1"
The net effect of other ACA policies on Medicare beneficiary
out-of-pocket spending is unclear. Some policies will likely reduce
out-of-pocket spending, such as the elimination of cost sharing for
preventive care' and pricing and delivery reforms to slow Medicare

180. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 172, at 3, 7. This description is for a standard
plan. Only about 10% of enrollees who do not qualify for the low-income subsidy are in a
plan with the standard plan design. One-third are enrolled in an actuarially equivalent
plan and the rest are in "enhanced" plans, where they pay higher premiums for greater
benefits. Id. at 4; see also JACK HOADLEY ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
MEDICARE PART D 2010 DATA SPOTLIGHT: A COMPARISON OF PDPS OFFERING BASIC
AND ENHANCED BENEFITS 1 (2009), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation
.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8034.pdf (reporting higher percentages of non-LIS
beneficiaries in basic, standard or actuarially equivalent plans).
181. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 172, at 5.
182. Id. at 6-7. Some specialty drugs fall under Part B coverage instead and could also
lead to high out-of-pocket costs through Part B cost sharing. See Peter A. Ubel et al., Full
Disclosure-Out-of-PocketCosts as Side Effects, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1484, 1484 (2013)
(estimating that a patient with metastatic colorectal cancer and only Medicare might pay
$8,800 out of pocket over a normal course of first-line chemotherapy treatment).
183. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 172, at 6. In 2008, the catastrophic phase
started after $5,726 in total spending, which means on average each individual also
incurred roughly $5,700 of spending in the catastrophic phase and paid $285 (or 5%) of
this amount out-of-pocket. Id. at 3.
184. Of course, spending is unevenly distributed among those whose spending exceeds
the threshold, which means some of these people likely spent little and others spent well
above the $285 average.
185. See ACA §§ 4104-4108,42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (2012).

2014]

HEALTH CARE SPENDING

1521

cost growth overall.'86 Yet, certain ACA policies could increase outof-pocket spending, at least for some people. For example, the law
could erode comprehensive forms of supplemental coverage. It
reduces the rates Medicare will pay to private Medicare Advantage
plans, a form of supplemental coverage with limited out-of-pocket
spending and relatively low premium costs." This reduction might
cause enrollment in these plans to drop by as much as one-third.'"
Likewise, the ACA might hasten the already ongoing erosion of
retiree supplemental plans through their former employers with the
so-called "Cadillac Tax" (an excise tax on high-cost, employersponsored health insurance). 89 People who lose their Medicare
Advantage or Cadillac coverage might face higher out-of-pocket
costs. Because the effect of these policies on net is unclear, they are
not factored into the projected spending below.
b.

Projected Spending and FinancialRisk

As the above discussion evinces, Medicare beneficiaries face a
complex picture of health insurance coverage. This complexity makes
it difficult for retirees to understand their coverage and to predict
spending.19 0 Yet, the stakes of decisions with respect to retiree health
insurance are high because a retiree could face very different
spending, based on what coverage she chooses.
186. See BERENSON & HOLAHAN, supra note 173, at 2-4 (discussing ACA efforts to
reduce provider payment rates through the Independent Payment Advisory Board,
Accountable Care Organizations, and other delivery reform policies).
187. Health Care Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1102, 124 Stat.
1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)). On average, the
government had paid these private plans more per person covered by the plan than what it
spent on Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. BERENSON & HOLAHAN, supra note 173,

at 2.
188. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COMPARISON OF PROJECTED ENROLLMENT IN
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS AND SUBSIDIES FOR EXTRA BENEFITS NOT COVERED
BY MEDICARE UNDER CURRENT LAW AND UNDER RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION
COMBINED WITH H.R. 3590 AS PASSED BY THE SENATE 3 (2010).
189. See ACA § 9001 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 49801 (Supp. 2011)). Starting in
2018, benefits worth more than $10,200 for an individual retiree or $27,500 for two or
more individuals will be subject to a 40% excise tax. Id. Other policies could have a similar
erosive effect. For example, starting in 2013, the subsidy to employers who offer retiree
drug coverage will also be taxed, eliminating an exemption created under the Medicare
Modernization Act and costing employers an additional $233 per retiree on average that
must be reported as a liability in annual reports. PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RES.
INST, No. 338, ISSUE BRIEF: IMPLICATIONS OF HEALTH REFORM FOR RETIREE HEALTH
BENEFITS 12 (2010).
190. See generally Hoffman & Jackson, supra note 14 (highlighting the mismatched
expectations of retirees on their health care expenditures compared to expert estimates of
costs).
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If a retiree in a median retiree income household has only
Original Medicare coverage plus drug coverage (Medicare Parts A, B,
and D), she will have low baseline costs but could have high variable
spending on cost sharing, as shown in Table 3A. She will spend only
about 5% of median retiree income on premiums for Parts B and
D. 91 But she risks unlimited cost sharing for inpatient and outpatient
care and substantial cost sharing for prescription drugs. One study
estimates that about one-third of Medicare beneficiaries without
supplemental coverage would have out-of-pocket cost sharing of over
$5,000 and one-fifth of over $7,000 during at least one year in a tenyear period.192

191. As noted above, the median household income for someone over age sixty-fivefrom Social Security, retiree benefits, and other sources-is just over $34,000. See
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supranote 29, at 6 tbl.1.
192. GLENN HACKBARTH & TRICIA NEUMAN, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY
COMM'N & KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEMORANDUM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SHARE OF
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES WHO WOULD BENEFIT FROM AN ANNUAL OUT-OF-POCKET
MAXIMUM OVER MULTIPLE YEARS 2 (2013).
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Table 3A: Maximum Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Spending in Scenario
Considering Retiree with Original Medicare
Determinants of OOP Spending
Annual
Uncovered
m
cotcare

Total
Pomsible

Maximum
Percentage

Spending

Income***

OOP

of

$1,216 for
hospitalization

Part A

Free

$304 daily
for days 6190
$608 daily
for days 91
to 150
All costs

after 150

No new
mandated
benefits
under the

Unlimited
cost sharing
Highly

ACA**

days

Part D

RTi

Retiree

$1250

$147
deductible
and 20% coinsurance

$1,250
premium +
unlimited
cost sharing

$480

~-$2,135*

~-$2,615*

$1,730

Unlimited

spending on
cost sharing

with
original

enin On

spending on

uncovered
essential

careonn

Medicare
_ _care

$1,730 on
premiums +
unlimited

5% on
premiums +
unlimited

cost sharing cost sharing

.
& spending
on
uncovered

& spending
on
uncovered
care

Based on an average spender in top 3%. $310 deductible plus 25% of spending to
catastrophic threshold) plus 5% thereafter (-$285 on average for top 3% of spenders1 93).
** Gaps that predate the ACA include no coverage of long-term care, dental care, hearing
aids, private nursing care, and limited prescription drug coverage of commonly used drugs in
some plans. These gaps create high potential that a beneficiary will have some spending on
uncovered essential care.
*** Percentage estimates are based on the median household income for households over age
sixty-five.
*

Original Medicare, both predating and following ACA
implementation, protects the average retiree, who does not use very
193. For explanation of the $285 estimate see supra notes 183-84 and accompanying

text.
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much care and thus does not face high cost sharing. But it leaves
those retirees with serious or unusual medical conditions to struggle
in the face of unlimited cost sharing, unless they have other coverage.
Medicare policy relies on the fact that most retirees will either obtain
supplemental health insurance to reduce or eliminate variable
spending or will deplete their income and assets to levels low enough
that they qualify for Medicaid supplemental coverage.194
When retirees obtain supplemental coverage, they invert the
concept of financial security under Original Medicare of low baseline
cost and high variable spending and catastrophic risk, replacing it
with higher baseline costs but low variable spending and catastrophic
risk, as illustrated in Table 3B. This is in effect the definition of
financial security that most retirees choose. Premiums alone for the
typical retiree might cost over $4,000, or 12% or more of median
retiree income. There is still some risk of variable spending from cost
sharing on prescription drugs, which could result in as much as $6,265
in total out-of-pocket spending or nearly one-fifth of income for
someone with median retiree household income. This picture of
financial security looks more like the one for exchange enrollees with
private coverage, one of high premiums, some variable spending, and
low catastrophic risk with respect to spending on covered benefits.

194. Seniors & Medicare and Medicaid Enrollees, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www
.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Population/Medicare-MedicaidEnrollees-Dual-Eligibles/Seniors-and-Medicare-and-Medicaid-Enrollees.html (last visited
Jan. 9, 2014) (describing low-income eligibility for Medicaid).
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Table 3B: Maximum Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Spending in Scenario
Considering Retiree with Medicare Coverage and Average
Supplemental Medigap Coverage
Determinants of OOP Spending

PartA

Annual
Premium

cost
Sharing

Free

$0

Total
Possible
OOP
Spending

Maximum
Percentage of

$0

0%

$1,250

4%

~-$2,615*

8%

N/A

$2,400

7%

*Riskof
spending on
uncovered

$6,265+
unlimited
spending

19% +
unlimited

on

spending on

care

uncovered

uncovered care

Uncovered
Care

No new
mandated
PartB

$1,250

$0

benefits
under the

ACA**
PartD

$480

~-$2,135*

Medigap

$2,400

$0

TOTAL
Retiree
with

with
$4,112

Medicare
and

$2,135

essential

Mfedigap

care

* Based on an average spender in top 3%. $310 deductible plus 25% of spending to
catastrophic threshold) plus 5% thereafter (-$285 on average for top 3% of spenders ).
** Gaps that predate the ACA include no coverage of long-term care, dental care, hearing
aids, private nursing care, and limited prescription drug coverage of commonly used drugs in
some plans. These gaps create high potential that a beneficiary will have some spending on
uncovered essential care.
*** Percentage estimates are based on the median household income for households over age
sixty-five.

However, as Tables 3A and 3B illustrate, Medicare beneficiaries
might also spend a significant amount on uncovered goods and
services, whether they have supplemental coverage or not. Medicare
covered benefits were mostly untouched by the ACA. Medicare and
even most Medigap plans do not cover long-term care, vision care,

195. See supra note 183-84 and accompanying text.
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dental care, hearing aids, or private nursing care.196 A large number of
Medicare beneficiaries use these benefits. For example, 41% used
dental services in 2008 and spent just under $700 on average; 16% of
beneficiaries spent more than $1,000 on uncovered dental services,
and nearly 10% spent over $2,000.197 Furthermore, many Medicare
Part D plans do not include some of the top ten most commonly used
brand drugs on their formularies, and, instead, only cover them at
higher cost-sharing levels with utilization management restrictions,
including quantity limits.198 For example, Celebrex, a popular painrelief drug that costs about $300 per month, is off formulary for over
one-quarter of enrollees and Lyrica is on a non-preferred tier for onethird of enrollees, doubling the insured's share of the cost of the
drug.199 With the exclusion or non-preferred treatment of such
popular drugs, out-of-pocket exposure to prescription drug costs
remains significant,2" despite the ACA's efforts to reduce it. In sum,
Medicare beneficiaries are in theory less vulnerable overall to
spending on uncovered medical care than those with ESI. Yet,
because the categories of benefits that are typically not covered are
commonly used, spending on uncovered care is more likely to cause
some retiree households financial strain.
Married couples with Medicare could be worse off than single
retirees, depending on their income. They could incur double the
costs and still not qualify for low-income subsidies, which are
available only for households with incomes up to 150% of the federal
poverty level (in contrast to 400% for exchange plans).2 01 Their total
out-of-pocket spending over the course of the year on premiums and
Part D cost sharing could be as much as $12,500. On top of this
amount, they might incur spending on uncovered items. Arguably,
this couple is in a more tenuous position than most of the people in
the other cases discussed above.
196. See CUBANSKI ET AL., supra note 147, at 20. According to this study, these
expenditures were nearly one-quarter of total out-of-pocket spending; the major
components of out-of-pocket spending in 2006 for all retirees (including those with any
form of supplemental coverage) were: premiums (39%), long-term care (19%), medical
providers and supplies (15%), prescription drugs (14%), dental (6%), and inpatient and
outpatient hospital costs (5%). Id. at 70.
197. KAISER FAMILY FOuND., ORAL HEALTH AND MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES:
COVERAGE, OUT-OF-POCKET SPENDING, AND UNMET NEED 3 (2012), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8325.pdf.
198. HOADLEY ET AL., supranote 178, at 6-7 (2012).
199. Id. at 7.
200. Fronstin et al., supra note 179, at 3 (showing high rates of out-of-pocket spending
for retirees in the seventy-fifth and ninetieth percentile of prescription drug users).
201. See supra notes 155, 172 and accompanying text.

2014]

HEALTH CARE SPENDING

1527

Three observations are evident from this final set of scenarios
looking at retirees with Medicare. First, she faces a much more
complex set of decisions when attempting to piece together financial
protections than either of the younger individuals considered here
do. 2' The ACA could have simplified this picture to increase the
chances that retirees did not face financial insecurity due to low
transparency, but lawmakers chose not to do so. Second, retirees face
high catastrophic spending risk unless they obtain supplemental
coverage. Buying supplemental Medigap and Part D coverage affords
a retiree considerable protection against catastrophic spending risk. A
retiree might still incur some cost-sharing obligations for prescription
drug costs and for items and services not covered by her plans.203
Finally, a retiree's premiums for supplemental coverage are likely to
consume a high percentage of income. Thus, health care regulation,
including most recently the ACA, results in a definition of financial
security for most retirees based on high premiums but very limited
variable spending and catastrophic risk from spending on covered
benefits.
III. DISCUSSION

A.

A Summary of FinancialRisk and Security in the Three Scenarios
The financial protections provided by the ACA improve
financial security in all of the above scenarios but in different ways
and to different degrees. Likewise, after full implementation of the
ACA, Americans with insurance are still vulnerable in different ways.
Table 4 offers a stylized summary of financial risk due to health care
spending following full implementation of the ACA.

202. A retiree could simplify decisions somewhat by selecting a Medicare Advantage
with a Prescription Drug plan, otherwise known as Medicare Part C, which combines the
benefits of Medicare Parts A, B, and D. Twenty-eight percent of Medicare beneficiaries
were enrolled in these plans in 2013. MARSHA GOLD ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 2013 SPOTLIGHT: ENROLLMENT MARKET UPDATE 1
(2013), availableat http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/8448.pdf.
203. If she chooses a plan with less comprehensive coverage, she might be exposed to
higher out-of-pocket spending at the point of service.
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Table 4: High-Level Summary of Financial Risk in Three
Scenarios of Insurance Coverage
Premi
urn
Spending

Risk
Individual
with
Exchange

Variable
Spending
Risk on

Catastrophic Spending Risk

Covered
Benefits

ovr
Covered
Benefits

on Uncovered
Care

o

ons

Medium

Medium

Low

Low

Low

Low-Medium

Low

Medium*

High

Low-Medium

Low

Medium**

Coverage

Worker
with
Epoe

Employer
Plan

Retiree
with
Medicare
&

* Potential amount of spending could be high but the probability is low.
** Potential amount of spending is relatively lower but the probability is high.

Table 4 suggests a few key takeaways. After the ACA is
implemented, premiums will not in themselves pose high spending
risk for most of the working-age population. Only retirees with
Medicare and Medigap are likely, as a whole, to spend more than
10% of income on premiums. Some older exchange enrollees might
also spend over 10% on premiums if living in an expensive state. The
burdens of premiums increase as people age, evincing a regulatory
choice not to eliminate age-based premiums, despite reducing their
magnitude.
Once insured people use medical care, most face some risk of
variable spending on covered benefits. For exchange plans and ESI,
the ACA attempts to reduce, but not to eliminate, the potential for
variable spending on most covered benefits through the cost-sharing
limits on essential health benefits. Most people with ESI have
additional limits on top of, and sometimes lower than, the ACA
limits. For retirees, the ACA, in conjunction with earlier Medigap
regulation, ensures that those with supplemental Medigap coverage
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will spend very little on covered medical care and considerably less on
prescription drugs than they would have before the ACA.
Variable cost sharing on covered benefits no longer poses
catastrophic spending risk for any of the groups. The ACA has
attempted to create consistency in this regard: it attempts to ensure
that anyone with insurance should be able to afford necessary care
covered by her health insurance plan.2 04
Some insured, however, still face high variable and catastrophic
spending risk on uncovered care. For exchange plans, the limits on
out-of-pocket spending on essential health benefits, when combined
with the mandate that plans cover these benefits, all but eliminate
catastrophic spending risk. But the ACA created the potential for a
significant gap in future ESI coverage by not mandating employer
plans cover these essential health benefits. To the extent an employer
decides not to cover categories of care, some employees will have to
pay for this type of care completely out of pocket and will thus face
the risk of very high spending. The likelihood of this spending on
uncovered care is low, based on the current state of employee
benefits, but the potential amount of spending if employers reduce
benefits is high. Like those with ESI, retirees may incur out-of-pocket
spending on uncovered care that might be medically necessary,
including on dental and vision care and long-term care.
Thus, the ACA limits variable spending on covered benefits for
all three populations. Yet, workers with ESI and retirees still face
catastrophic risk for spending on uncovered and potentially essential
care.
This picture reveals that after full ACA implementation, for each
population, health policy reduces certain aspects of financial risk but
leaves insured people vulnerable to other aspects. Health policy has,
in effect, created three different regulatory definitions of financial
security for the three populations considered:
For the individual buying silver-level exchange coverage,
financial security is defined as low catastrophicrisk.
For the worker with ESI, regulatory deference to employers
reinforces the employers' definition of financial security, which
typically results in low baseline spending and relatively low
variablespending and low catastrophicrisk on covered benefits.
204. Because the ACA cost-sharing limits do not apply to non-essential benefits in ESI
plans, spending on these benefits could still be unlimited if an employer plan does not limit
cost sharing on all covered benefits by its terms.
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For a retiree with Medicare and Medigap, it is a picture of
financial security as low variable spending and low catastrophic

risk for spending on covered benefits.
However, each scenario reveals that insured individuals may still
struggle in the face of health care spending in the post-ACA
environment, regardless of their type of insurance:
Exchange enrollees may incur moderate to high recurrent
baseline spending. That is, they will reliably spend a substantial
amount every year on premiums plus variable spending on cost
sharing, even if healthy.
Although most employer plans are currently relatively
comprehensive, workers may face catastrophic risk of spending
on uncovered, essential benefits if employers choose not to
cover categories of care. Workers may also face moderate risk
of variable spending on cost sharing on covered benefits, as
employers continue to increase cost sharing in light of growing
health care spending, but no more than allowed by the ACA
limits.
Finally, retirees may face both high baseline spending, from
high premiums plus some cost sharing on prescription drugs,
and also risk of catastrophic spending on uncovered care, even
if long-term care is excluded from the picture. They are the only
population that, as a whole, must contend simultaneously with
high spending in a typical year and the potential for
catastrophic spending in a bad year.
The above scenarios thus reveal ways in which Americans will
enjoy different financial protections and will face different types of
threats to financial security from health care spending after full
implementation of the ACA.
B.

Evaluationof the InconsistentPicture of FinancialRisk After the
ACA

The question of whether this inconsistent picture is normatively
desirable-or perhaps politically necessary, even if not idealremains. While answering this question is necessarily beyond the
scope of this brief discussion, this Section begins to tease out some
key considerations.
This heterogeneous picture of financial protections and risk at
first blush might seem to suggest that the ACA has created a
marketplace for financial security, where insured could choose the
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type of coverage that best meets their individual preferences for
health care spending risk. This theory, however, fails for two reasons.
First, as before the ACA, consumers still generally cannot move
fluidly between these different types of insurance. Someone who buys
exchange coverage likely does not have access to an employer plan. A
worker with an employer plan must give up employer contributions
and beneficial tax treatment of spending on health care if opting out
of ESI and obtaining exchange coverage instead. Although this
tradeoff might make sense for some low-income workers if they
qualify for exchange subsidies, it would not for most middle-income
workers. Medicare beneficiaries are not eligible for exchange
subsidies. And most people with exchange coverage and employer
plans do not yet qualify for Medicare. Second, even if a marketplace
existed among these types of coverage, it would not be one consumers
could easily understand and navigate. The different pictures of
financial risk for different forms of coverage are extremely opaque to
the average consumer. Even if they were transparent, consumers
typically struggle with decisions that involve risk or uncertainty, such
as those concerning health insurance.205
A second possibility is that the regulations are intentionally
tailored to best meet the particular needs of the insured in each
group. While consistency may be easier from a consumer perspective,
it might make policy sense for protections to vary if aligned with the
needs and resources of different populations. Perhaps consumer
groups have demanded the best protections they could garner for
people with exchange coverage, labor unions and employee advocates
have demanded what is most important for those with employer
plans, and the AARP has secured the financial protections most
desired by retirees with Medicare and Medigap. Is it possible that the
ACA is a story of democratic success, where each definition of
financial security best fits the needs of the relevant group of insured,
in light of political constraints? Consider each in turn.
For the person with a silver-level plan from the individual market
exchange, the ACA creates protection from catastrophic risk, but a
forty year-old worker could spend from 10% of median household
income in a healthy year to as much as 20% in an unhealthy one on
205. For an overview of cognitive biases with respect to risk and uncertainty, see
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, DebiasingThrough Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 20325 (2006); see also Howell E. Jackson, Accounting for Social Security Benefits, in
BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 261, 271-75 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds.,
2006) (illustrating the "range of cognitive biases that may affect participant perceptions of
the value of Social Security benefits").
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premiums and cost sharing. Is this definition and, in particular, the
possibility for high baseline spending in exchange for low catastrophic
risk during key working years sensible for someone who seeks out
coverage on an exchange?
Perhaps an individual with median household income should
reasonably expect to spend a share of that income on health care.
Most people consider their health important. Someone in her working
years may have other compelling expenses, especially if raising
children, building a career, or paying off educational debt. But the
ACA subsidy structure takes into account the higher cost of living for
a family, as opposed to an individual, as illustrated above. In addition,
someone at the age of forty has more flexibility to adjust earnings or
to borrow in any one year, if necessary, to cover a year or two of
relatively bad health. And the ACA limits the magnitude of spending,
even in a bad year, so that, in theory, recovery from such a year is
now easier.
On the flip side, this level of spending may be too much to expect
many American households to manage on a continuing basis. One
touchstone scholars have used is that spending more than 10% of
income on health care is too high.206 By this rule, most exchange
coverage would fail. Studies have shown that far smaller amounts of
spending can trigger bankruptcy.2 07 Young workers have fewer assets
and less credit history to support borrowing. Household income has
stagnated over the past twenty years, shrinking disposable income so
that health care spending at the levels likely for exchange enrollees
may conflict with spending on other basic needs.2 08 By this logic, this
model's high baseline may cause more people more angst.
The bottom line for the exchange population is that the ACA
does not eliminate spending-in fact, for some it requires spending a
considerable portion of income on premiums and cost sharing even in
the typical year-but it attempts to eliminate catastrophic spending
potential on those items and services considered "essential."209 Thus,
the key question going forward is whether the level of spending
required in a typical year is consistent with financial security for this

206. See Jessica S. Banthin et al., Financial Burden of Health Care, 2001-2004, 27
HEALTH AFF. 188, 189 (2008).

207. See Jacoby & Holman, supra note 2, at 265 (finding that over 80% of respondents
in bankruptcy study reported medical debts of under $5,000).
208. See Reinhardt,supra note 132.
209. Of course any items not considered "essential" would be financed completely outof-pocket, which makes the definition of "essential" a critical consideration.
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population or whether it might, in itself, unacceptably threaten a
family's financial security.
This question is difficult to answer definitively ex ante. The
vehement opposition to the individual mandate and resistance among
some Americans to buying exchange policies suggests that they fear
unmanageable baseline spending. And the media has seized upon the
cost of premiums as a problem for middle class purchasers.2 10 Many
Americans are not accustomed to allocating a significant portion of
their income to health care spending. On the other hand, doing so
might serve some of them in the long run, by helping them to smooth
health care spending, rather than taking (and perhaps losing) a
gamble that they will not need expensive medical care.
It is worth noting that the high baseline costs some face after the
ACA regulation are largely the result of larger systemic spending
problems, not the effect of individual underwriting leading to high
premiums for some insured. Health care utilization patterns and
prices make the United States the top country in terms of spending
per capita on health care. 211 The way to reduce this high baseline outof-pocket spending for individual exchanges enrollees is either to
address underlying health care spending or to increase subsidies.
Concern with high baseline spending for exchange enrollees might
increase pressure to ameliorate the larger underlying cost problem.
For the worker in an employer plan, the ACA largely did not
tackle the problem of financial security head on. Rather, it affirms a
regulatory definition of financial security protections that predated
the ACA and is based on an employer's definition. Does this
deference make sense?
From one perspective, this deference might have been wise. It is
part of an attempt not to disrupt relatively good coverage predating
the ACA. In its current form, most ESI protects workers well from
financial risk due to out-of-pocket health care spending, especially
when compared to all other insured. The typical worker with ESI will
pay very little out of pocket on health care, even in an unhealthy year.
210. See, e.g., Katie Thomas et al., New Health Law Frustrates Many in Middle Class,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2013, at Al; Julie Appleby, Some Middle-Class Families Find Price
Of Subsidized Health Coverage 'Awfully High,' KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2014/February/10/Middle-class-familiessubsidized-insurance-premiums.aspx (explaining that the middle class is caught in the
position of earning too much income to receive a subsidy, but not enough income to be
indifferent to cost).
211. OECD, OECD HEALTH DATA 2013: How DOES THE UNITED STATES
COMPARE 1 (2013) (reporting $8,508 per capita spending in the United States, as
compared to an OECD average of $3,339).
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And the ACA limits both variable spending and catastrophic risk for
spending on essential benefits in ESI plans, to the extent an employer
covers these benefits. This means that if an employer covers essential
health benefits, employees with ESI will almost certainly spend less
out of pocket than other insured. This deference might also be based
on a belief that the market will check employers who try to offer less
comprehensive benefits.
On the other hand, the ACA's deference could simply signal the
influence of strong business interests over the legislative process and
could leave workers vulnerable in the long run. The ACA preserves,
and perhaps exacerbates, the potential for high spending on
uncovered items and services. While the risk of coverage gaps is more
theoretical than realized, the ACA does nothing to guarantee
comprehensive ESI benefits. Assumptions that the market will police
these plans can only go so far. The bare-bones "mini-med" coverage
offered by many employers, such as McDonalds, and the lack of
coverage by others, most notoriously Walmart, offer evidence that
not all employers will choose definitions that protect workers
financially and not all workers can bargain for better.
All insured face some risk of spending on uncovered items, to
different degrees. From one perspective, this risk might not pose a
public policy concern. If insurance covers a basic core of services that
are fundamentally important to health and wellbeing, perhaps
spending outside that core of services should be discretionary and
borne individually.212 For example, if an individual wants to try an
experimental and expensive fertility treatment or one with low
effectiveness or benefit, protecting her against this type of spending
may be a lower social priority than protecting her against the first-line
treatment for breast cancer. This prioritization ensures that shared
resources are spent in ways that are of the highest social value.
Yet, from a social welfare perspective, spending on uncovered
services is a concern if health insurance regulation has done a poor
job of shaping coverage. After the ACA, an employee with ESI is, in
theory, at the greatest risk in this regard. In the other two scenarios
considered, regulators have defined core benefits, ideally with social
welfare concerns in mind, even if some gaps exist. If employers do not
212. Cf Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture:
The Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L.
REv. 523, 545-60 (2014) (proposing an approach to improve efficiency in the use of
medical care by rating treatments by value level and enabling consumers to contract for
services based on value level, paying more for lower-value services and less for highervalue ones).
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prioritize their employees' financial wellbeing, spending on
uncovered and essential services could pose catastrophic financial
risk.213
On balance, the risk workers face is more theoretical than real at
the moment, which means that those with ESI still face the least
potential for out-of-pocket spending, following ACA implementation.
To the extent employers scale back benefits to a level that poses
public policy concerns, however, it may be necessary to end
regulatory deference on the terms of ESI benefits.
Finally, for Medicare beneficiaries, Original Medicare preserves
low baseline costs in exchange for high potential catastrophic risk.
However, regulators act under the presumption that 90% of retirees
will not rely on Medicare alone for coverage. For most, the purchase
of private supplemental coverage inverts the final risk profile, which
affords retirees relatively low catastrophic risk in return for high
baseline costs. In this way, the definition of financial security for
retirees looks similar to that for people buying coverage on the
exchanges. Highly regulated, private supplemental plans reduce
catastrophic risk in exchange for high premiums.
Before the ACA, Medicare beneficiaries were arguably the best
protected from financial risk, and individually insured under age
sixty-five were the most vulnerable of all insured. Following full
implementation, Medicare beneficiaries are more vulnerable in
several ways than younger insured who buy exchange plans. First,
even if premiums consume a similar share of income for a member of
each group with median household income, the ACA provides
premium and cost-sharing subsidies for exchange coverage for those
earning up to 400% of the federal poverty level, significantly more
generous than the subsidies available to retirees, only up to 135%.214
Second, with the exchanges, the ACA attempts to create a
marketplace with higher transparency and clearer choices so that
individuals can tradeoff premiums and cost-sharing risk to some
degree. Regulation of private Medigap plans has created a
marketplace that is too opaque for retirees to make meaningful
213. In addition, even if benefits covered are comprehensive, if insurance networks are
insufficient, enrollees might be forced to go out of network for services, incurring either a
larger percentage of or all of the costs of treatment for even core services. State regulators
might monitor the sufficiency of networks for the individual market or exchange plans, but
employers who self-insure can typically design networks however they might choose.
214. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. Subsidies are available up to 150% of
the federal poverty level for prescription drug coverage. See supra note 172 and
accompanying text.
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choices among supplemental coverage options. In response, most opt
for the highest level of coverage in Plan F. If instead of being
categorized by letters that have no meaning to consumers, Medigap
plans were arrayed on a dimension of value and sold in a way that
retirees might understand, more like exchange plans, beneficiaries
would have a chance to make more educated tradeoffs.
Finally, Medicare beneficiaries likely face higher risk of spending
on essential uncovered items than those with exchange coverage. The
ACA includes most of the items and services someone with exchange
coverage would use in the mandated essential health benefits.
Medicare's coverage gaps are more likely to leave retirees without
benefits in areas where they need care. Even with supplemental
coverage, many spend significant amounts on drugs that are only
covered in part or not at all under their Part D plans or on dental or
vision care, as well as on long-term care. A retiree with few other
necessary expenses may be able to manage this spending. On the
other hand, most median-income retirees have fixed income and
insufficient savings, and spending on uncovered health care could
easily compromise their basic standard of living.
When viewed in comparison to the other forms of insurance
coverage following implementation of the ACA, some retirees are in
a relatively vulnerable position with high baseline costs and still the
potential for catastrophic spending risk. Of course, they can rely on
Medicaid as a safety net, but they must first deplete their assets and
compromise their standard of living significantly to do so. This result
could be avoided through more generous Medicare premium
subsidies and reconsideration of what covered benefits should be
treated as essential for retirees.
In sum, it is not obvious that the resultant inconsistency in
financial protections for insured people is designed deliberately to
best meet the needs of each group.216 Thus, this particular regulatory
status quo should be disrupted if aspects of it prove undesirable as the
ACA is implemented.

215. The ability to make educated tradeoffs, both for exchange enrollees and for
retirees, is admittedly limited by low financial literacy and the complexity of insurance
purchase decisions, even assuming the insurance exchanges eventually function smoothly.
Cf., e.g., Jackson, supra note 205; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 205.
216. This inconsistency might, however, represent the best protection possible for each
group, in light of the political compromise necessary to pass the ACA. Of course, that
moment of political compromise does not necessarily preclude changes, whether
legislative or regulatory, later.

2014]

HEALTH CARE SPENDING

1537

CONCLUSION

This Article has shown that the ACA is likely to reduce financial
risk from health care spending for Americans. However, it does so
differently depending on the type of health insurance an individual
has. The result is different points of financial vulnerability for each
insured group. In addition, the ACA may create a more complex total
picture than is necessary. Individuals who move from one type of
insurance to another over their lifetimes must learn a new system and
a new strategy for protecting themselves against unmanageable health
care spending. A system with more consistent protections and
expectations throughout life's circumstances and phases would be
much easier for consumers to understand and navigate. Thus,
although improving the financial security of Americans on balance,
the ACA also represents a missed opportunity to simplify financial
protections and to create a more equitable system of such protections
among types of health insurance.
The places where the highest risk remains for an average
American household-baseline spending for exchange enrollees,
catastrophic spending on uncovered care for employer insurance, and
baseline spending plus the possibility of catastrophic spending on
uncovered care for retirees-could result in unacceptable levels of
financial insecurity for some Americans. With a fragmented structure
comes a heightened monitoring obligation to ensure that some
subsets of the population are not especially vulnerable. As ACA
implementation continues, these areas of greatest vulnerability must
be carefully watched and measured to determine which points of
vulnerability should be the target of future health policy.
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